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There is no unique extension of the standard notion of probabilistic independence to the
case where probabilities are indeterminate or imprecisely speciﬁed. Epistemic independence
is an extension that formalises the intuitive idea of mutual irrelevance between different
sources of information. This gives epistemic independence very wide scope as well as
appeal: this interpretation of independence is often taken as natural also in precise-
probabilistic contexts. Nevertheless, epistemic independence has received little attention
so far. This paper develops the foundations of this notion for variables assuming values
in ﬁnite spaces. We deﬁne (epistemically) independent products of marginals (or possibly
conditionals) and show that there always is a unique least-committal such independent
product, which we call the independent natural extension. We supply an explicit formula
for it, and study some of its properties, such as associativity, marginalisation and
external additivity, which are basic tools to work with the independent natural extension.
Additionally, we consider a number of ways in which the standard factorisation formula
for independence can be generalised to an imprecise-probabilistic context. We show,
under some mild conditions, that when the focus is on least-committal models, using the
independent natural extension is equivalent to imposing a so-called strong factorisation
property. This is an important outcome for applications as it gives a simple tool to make
sure that inferences are consistent with epistemic independence judgements. We discuss
the potential of our results for applications in Artiﬁcial Intelligence by recalling recent work
by some of us, where the independent natural extension was applied to graphical models.
It has allowed, for the ﬁrst time, the development of an exact linear-time algorithm for the
imprecise probability updating of credal trees.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and motivation
This is a paper on the notion of independence in probability theory. Anyone interested in or familiar with uncertain
reasoning or statistics knows how fundamental this notion is. But what is independence?
Most of us have been taught that two variables X1 and X2 are independent when their joint probability distribution
P {1,2} factorises as the product of its marginals P1 and P2. This is the formalist route that deﬁnes independence through a
mathematical property of the joint, and that has its roots in the Kolmogorovian, measure- and integral-theoretic formalisa-
tion of probability theory.
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due to a large extent to Bruno de Finetti [17]—, independence has much more often an epistemic ﬂavour: it is a subject who
regards two variables as independent, because she judges that learning about the value of any one of them will not affect
her beliefs about the other. This means that the subject assesses that her conditional beliefs equal her marginal ones:
P1(·|X2) = P1 and P2(·|X1) = P2, in more mathematical parlance.
That the epistemic approach has become so popular, should not be all that surprising. The formalist approach comes
with the idea that independence is something given, which might hold or not: it is just a property of the joint. On the
epistemic view, however, independence is something we are (to some extent) in control of. And this control is essential in
order to aggregate simple, independent components into complex multivariate models.
It might be argued that the difference between the two approaches is mostly philosophical: in fact, the two routes are
known to be formally equivalent.1 But it turns out that we lose this formal equivalence as soon as we consider probabilities
that may be imprecisely speciﬁed, meaning that the available information is conveniently expressed through sets of proba-
bilities (sets of mass functions). In this case the two routes diverge also mathematically, as we shall see further on. This is
exempliﬁed by the existence of the different notions of strong and epistemic independence, respectively.2 Of these two, strong
independence has been most thoroughly investigated in the literature. Studies of epistemic independence are conﬁned to
a relatively small number of papers [6,10,26,29] inspired by Peter Walley’s [30, Section 9.3] seminal ideas. We mention in
particular Paolo Vicig’s interesting study [29], for the case of coherent lower probabilities (which may be deﬁned on inﬁnite
spaces), of some of the notions considered in this paper as well.
This situation is somewhat unfortunate as the scope of strong independence is relatively narrow: in fact, its justiﬁcation
seems to rely on a sensitivity analysis interpretation of imprecise probabilities. On this interpretation, one assumes that there
exists some (kind of ‘ideal’ or ‘true’) precise probability P T{1,2} for the variables X1 and X2 that satisﬁes stochastic indepen-
dence, and that, due to the lack of time or other resources, can only be partially speciﬁed or assessed. Then one considers
all the precise-probabilistic models P {1,2} that are consistent with the partial assessments and that satisfy stochastic inde-
pendence. Taken together, they constitute the set of probabilities for the problem under consideration. This set models a
subject’s (partial) ignorance about the true model P T{1,2} .
It is questionable that this sensitivity analysis interpretation is broadly applicable, for the simple reason that it hinges
on the assumption of the existence of the underlying ‘true’ probability P T{1,2} . Consider the situation where we wish to
model an expert’s beliefs: the expert usually does not know much about ideal probabilities, and what she tells us is simply
that information about one variable does not inﬂuence her beliefs about the other. Moreover, we could well argue that
expert knowledge is inherently imprecise to some extent, no matter the resources that we employ to capture it.3 Therefore,
why not take the expert at her word and model only the information she provides us about the mutual irrelevance of
the two variables under consideration? After all, forcing a sensitivity analysis interpretation here would amount to adding
unwarranted assumptions, which may lead us to draw stronger conclusions than those the expert herself might be prepared
to get to.
In order to model such mutual irrelevance, we need a different understanding of imprecise probability models that
does not (necessarily) rely on precise probability as a more primitive notion: Walley’s behavioural theory of imprecise
probability [30], which models beliefs by looking at a subject’s buying and selling prices for gambles. The perceived mutual
irrelevance of two sources of information can be formalised easily in this framework: we state that the subject is not going
to change her prices for gambles that depend on one variable, when the other variable is observed. This turns out to be
still equivalent to modelling the problem through a set of precise probabilities P {1,2} but, in contradistinction with the
case of sensitivity analysis, not all those probabilities satisfy stochastic independence in general. The reason for this is that
epistemic independence is a property of the set of probabilities that cannot be explained through the properties of the
precise probabilities that make up the set. This point is not without importance, as it shows that buying and selling prices
for gambles are actually a more primitive and fundamental notion in a theory of personal probability.
This illustrates that a behavioural theory of probability and the notion of epistemic independence ﬁt nicely together.
It also indicates that epistemic independence has a very wide scope, as it needs to meet fewer requirements than strong
independence in order to be employed. That being so, why has strong independence been studied and applied much more
extensively than its epistemic counterpart, even in work based on Walley’s approach? This is probably due to a number
of concurring factors: (i) a tendency in the literature to extend stochastic independence, perhaps somewhat uncritically, in
a straightforward way to imprecise probabilities; (ii) the fact that epistemic independence does not appear to be as well-
behaved as strong independence, for instance with respect to the graphoid axioms [6]4; and, perhaps more importantly,
(iii) the lack of formal tools for handling epistemic independence assessments. To give a telling illustration of this last
point: epistemically independent products have so far been given a formal deﬁnition [30, Section 9.3] only for the case of
1 There may be subtleties, however, related to events of probability zero. See Refs. [6, Notes 5 and 6 in Section 3], [30, Sections 6.5 and 6.10] and [1] for
more information.
2 Other possible ways to deﬁne independence under imprecise probability are given in Ref. [2].
3 See [30, Chapter 5] for a detailed exposition of this view.
4 But also see Ref. [26] for a discussion with less negative conclusions.
G. de Cooman et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1911–1950 1913two variables X1 and X2. Finally, note that preliminary work on the subject of this paper has appeared in the conferences
IPMU 2010 [15] and SMPS 2010 [14].
1.2. Aims and contributions
In the present paper, then, we intend to address and remedy this lack of formal tools by providing a ﬁrm foundation for,
and a thorough mathematical discussion of, epistemic independence in the case of a ﬁnite number of variables Xn taking
values in ﬁnite sets Xn , n ∈ N . Perhaps surprisingly, this will also shed positive new light on the second of the above-
mentioned factors: it will allow us to show that, despite the apparently negative results in Ref. [6], epistemic independence
can actually be used effectively in at least some types of graphical models. We will come back to this issue later in this
Introduction.
We ground our analysis in the conceptual and formal framework of coherent lower previsions, which are lower expectation
functionals equivalent to closed convex sets of probability mass functions. In the case of precise probabilities, we refer to
an expectation functional as a linear prevision. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to coherent lower previsions and reports
basic results that will be used in the rest of the paper. It should make the paper as self-contained as is reasonably achievable
within the scope of a research paper.
The real work starts in Section 3, where we introduce and discuss several generalisations to coherent lower previsions
of the standard notion of factorisation: productivity, which was used by some of us in Ref. [12] to derive a very general law
of large numbers, factorisation and strong factorisation, which we needed in our research on credal networks (an imprecise-
probabilistic graphical model) [11], the Kuznetsov and strong Kuznetsov properties, originating in the work of the Russian
mathematician Vladimir Kuznetsov [19], and also studied by Fabio Cozman [3]. It is useful to keep in mind that the ‘strong’
versions of these properties involve factorisations over any subsets of variables, while the ‘plain’ ones are the special case
obtained when some of the subsets are singletons. For linear previsions—the precise-probability models—all these properties
coincide with the classical notion of stochastic independence. For the more general lower previsions, we investigate how
these notions are related, and we show that the strong product—the product that arises through strong independence—is
strongly factorising.
In Section 4, we go over to the epistemic side. We introduce two notions: many-to-many independence, where a subject
judges that learning about the value that any subset of the variables {Xn: n ∈ N} assumes will not affect her beliefs about
the values of any other disjoint subset; and the weaker notion of many-to-one independence, where she judges that learning
about the value that any subset of the variables assumes will not affect her beliefs about the value of any remaining single
variable. This leads to the deﬁnition of two corresponding types of independent products. We prove some useful associativity
and marginalisation properties for these, which form a basis for building them recursively, and prove a very useful theorem
that immediately allows all these notions, as well as the results in the rest of the paper, to be extended to the case
of conditional independence. Moreover, we show that the strong product is one particular many-to-many (and therefore
many-to-one) independent product, and that it is the only such independent product when the given marginals are linear
previsions.
There is no such uniqueness in the more general case of marginal lower previsions: the strong product is only one of
the generally inﬁnitely many possible independent products. In Section 5, we focus on the pointwise smallest of all these:
the least-committal many-to-many, and the least-committal many-to-one, independent products of given marginals. It is
an important, and quite involved, result of our analysis that these two smallest independent products turn out to always
exist, and to coincide. We call this common smallest independent product the independent natural extension of the given
marginals. It generalises, to any ﬁnite number of variables, a deﬁnition given by Walley for two variables [30, Section 9.3].5
We then go on to derive an explicit and constructive formula for the independent natural extension, and we prove that it
too satisﬁes useful associativity and marginalisation properties, and that it is externally additive. We work out interesting
particular cases in some detail.
The relation with the more formal factorisation properties considered in Section 3 comes to the fore in our important
next result: that the independent natural extension is strongly factorising. We go somewhat further in Section 7, where
we show that, quite naturally, any factorising lower prevision must be a many-to-one independent product. Under some
mild conditions, we also show that any strongly factorising lower prevision must be a many-to-many independent product.
And since we already know that the smallest many-to-one independent product is the independent natural extension, we
deduce that when looking for least-committal models, it is immaterial whether we focus on factorisation or on being an
independent product. This outcome might be very important in applications, as it allows one to work with the independent
natural extension simply by imposing a (strong) factorisation property while searching for least-committal models. On the
more theoretical side, it constitutes a solid bridge between the formalist and epistemic approaches to independence.
We believe these results give epistemic independence an opportunity to become a competitive alternative to more
consolidated notions of independence. But how can epistemic independence be used in speciﬁc examples, and are there
advantages to doing so? We present an interesting case study in Section 8, where we survey and discuss some of our recent
work on credal trees [11]. These constitute a special case of credal networks [4], which in turn extend Bayesian nets to
5 In the simple case of two variables, there is no need to distinguish between many-to-one and many-to-many independence.
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of a Bayesian net with imprecise ones, and by re-interpreting the Markov condition through strong rather than stochastic
independence. But we have already argued that this might not be the best choice in all cases. For this reason, the work
in Ref. [11] imposes an epistemic Markov condition on directed trees. We discuss this condition and provide some exam-
ples, showing that it makes certain variables in the tree become epistemically many-to-many independent. Moreover, we
show how the independent natural extension, and its properties proved here, are crucial stepping stones that allow us to
construct the least-committal joint model over the tree that arises out of the parameters through the epistemic Markov
condition. This particular type of joint allows for the development of an exact linear-time message-passing algorithm that
performs imprecise-probabilistic updating of the epistemic tree. That this is at all possible, is rather surprising because of
the above-mentioned perceived incompatibilities between epistemic independence and the graphoid axioms. It shows that
epistemic independence has a signiﬁcant role to play in probabilistic-graphical models.
We summarise our views on the results of this paper in Section 9. Appendices A and B respectively collect the proofs of
all results, and the counterexamples needed to explore the relations between the many notions we introduce and study.
2. Coherent lower previsions
Let us give a brief overview of the concepts and results from the theory of coherent lower previsions that we use in this
paper. We refer to Ref. [30] for an in-depth study, and to Ref. [21] for a survey.
2.1. Lower and upper previsions
Consider a variable X taking values in some possibility space X , which we assume in this paper to be ﬁnite. The theory
of coherent lower previsions aims to model uncertainty about the value of X by means of lower and upper previsions of
gambles. A gamble is a real-valued function on X , and we denote by L (X) the set of all gambles on X . This set is
a linear space under pointwise addition of gambles, and pointwise multiplication of gambles with real numbers. For any
subset A of L (X), we denote by posi(A ) the set of all positive linear combinations of gambles in A :
posi(A ) :=
{
n∑
k=1
λk fk: fk ∈A , λk > 0, n > 0
}
.
We call A a convex cone if it is closed under positive linear combinations, meaning that posi(A ) =A .
For any two gambles f and g on a set X , we write ‘ f  g ’ if (∀x ∈X ) f (x)  g(x), and ‘ f > g ’ if f  g and f = g .
A gamble f > 0 is called positive. A gamble g  0 is called non-positive. L (X) =0 denotes the set of all non-zero gambles,
L (X)>0 the convex cone of all positive gambles, and L (X)0 the convex cone of all non-positive gambles on X .
A lower prevision is a real-valued functional P deﬁned on L (X). The lower prevision P is said to be coherent when it
satisﬁes the following three conditions:
C1. P ( f )min f for all f ∈L (X);
C2. P (λ f ) = λP ( f ) for all f ∈L (X) and real λ 0;
C3. P ( f + g) P ( f ) + P (g) for all f , g ∈L (X).
The conjugate of a lower prevision P is called an upper prevision. It is denoted by P , and deﬁned by P ( f ) := −P (− f ) for
any gamble f on X .
One interesting particular case of lower previsions are the vacuous ones. Given a non-empty subset A of X , the vacuous
lower prevision P A relative to A is given by P A( f ) = minx∈A f (x). It serves as an appropriate model for those situations
where the only information we have about X is that it takes a value in the set A.
2.2. Linear previsions and envelope theorems
A coherent lower prevision P on L (X) satisfying P ( f + g) = P ( f ) + P (g) for all f , g ∈ L (X) is called a linear
prevision, and is usually denoted by P . It corresponds to an expectation operator associated with the additive probability
that is its restriction to events. We denote the set of all linear previsions on L (X) by P(X). For any linear prevision P
on L (X), the corresponding mass function p is deﬁned by p(x) := P (I{x}), x ∈X , where I{x} denotes the indicator of the
singleton {x}. Then of course P ( f ) =∑x∈X f (x)p(x).
Linear previsions can also be used to characterise the notion of coherence for lower previsions: a lower prevision P is
coherent if and only if it is the lower envelope of the closed convex set of dominating linear previsions
M (P ) := {P ∈ P(X): (∀ f ∈L (X))P ( f ) P ( f )},
so we have
P ( f ) = min{P ( f ): P ∈M (P )}.
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denote by ext(M (P )):
P ( f ) = min{P ( f ): P ∈ ext(M (P ))},
where P is an extreme point of M (P ) when it cannot be written as a non-trivial convex combination of two different
elements of M (P ).
2.3. Conditional lower previsions
Next, consider a number of variables Xn , n ∈ N , taking values in the respective ﬁnite sets Xn . Here N is some ﬁnite
index set.
For every subset R of N , we denote by XR the tuple of variables (with one component for each r ∈ R) that takes values
in the Cartesian product XR :=×r∈R Xr . This Cartesian product is the set of all maps xR from R to ⋃r∈R Xr such that
xr := xR(r) ∈ Xr for all r ∈ R . The elements of XR are generically denoted by xR or zR , with corresponding components
xr := xR(r) or zr := zR(r), r ∈ R . We will always assume that the variables Xr are logically independent, which means that for
each non-empty subset R of N , XR may assume all values in XR .
We must pay particular attention to the case R = ∅. By deﬁnition, X∅ is the set of all maps from ∅ to ⋃r∈∅Xr = ∅. It
contains only one element x∅: the empty map. This means that there is no uncertainty about the value of the variable X∅:
it can assume only one value (the empty map). Moreover I{x∅} = 1.
We also denote by L (XR) the set of gambles deﬁned on XR . We will frequently use the simplifying device of iden-
tifying a gamble f R on XR with its cylindrical extension to XN , which is the gamble f˜ R deﬁned by f˜ R(xN ) := f R(xR) for
all xN ∈XN , where xR is the restriction (i.e., the projection) of xN to XR . To give an example, if K ⊆L (XN ), this trick
allows us to consider K ∩L (XR) as the set of those gambles in K that depend only (at most) on the variable XR . As
another example, this device allows us to identify the gambles I{xR } and I{xR }×XN\R , and therefore also the events {xR} and{xR} ×XN\R . More generally, for any event A ⊆XR , we can identify the gambles IA and IA×XN\R , and therefore also the
events A and A ×XN\R . In the same spirit, a lower prevision on all gambles in L (XR) can be identiﬁed with a lower
prevision deﬁned on the set of corresponding gambles on XN , a subset of L (XN ). If in particular R is the empty set, then
L (X∅) corresponds to the set of real numbers, which we can also identify with the set of constant gambles on XN .
If P N is a coherent lower prevision on L (XN ), then for any non-empty subset R of N we can consider its XR -marginal
P R as the coherent lower prevision on L (XR) deﬁned by P R( f ) := P N ( f ) for all gambles f on XR : the restriction of P N
to gambles that depend only (at most) on XR .
Given two disjoint subsets O and I of N , we deﬁne a conditional lower prevision P O∪I (·|XI ) as a special two-place
function. For any xI ∈XI , P O∪I (·|xI ) is a real functional on the set L (XO∪I ) of all gambles on XO∪I . For any gamble f
on XO∪I , P O∪I ( f |xI ) is the lower prevision of f , conditional on XI = xI . Moreover, the object P O∪I ( f |XI ) is considered as the
gamble on XI that assumes the value P O∪I ( f |xI ) in xI .
We are allowing for I and O to be empty, mainly for the sake of generality and elegance in mathematical formulation
and proofs. If I = ∅, then XI = X∅ assumes its only possible value (the empty map x∅) with certainty, so conditioning on
X∅ = x∅ amounts to not conditioning at all, and P O∪I ( f |XI ) is then essentially the same thing as an unconditional lower
prevision P O . We will come back to the other case O = ∅ shortly.
We now turn to the most important rationality criteria for such conditional lower previsions. The conditional lower
prevision P O∪I (·|XI ) is called separately coherent when it satisﬁes the following three conditions for all xI ∈ XI , non-
negative λ and gambles f , g ∈L (XO∪I ):
SC1. P O∪I ( f |xI )minxO∈XO f (xO , xI );
SC2. P O∪I (λ f |xI ) = λP O∪I ( f |xI );
SC3. P O∪I ( f + g|xI ) P O∪I ( f |xI ) + P O∪I (g|xI ).
When SC3 is satisﬁed with equality for all f , g ∈ L (XO∪I ), then P O∪I (·|XI ) is called a conditional linear prevision, and
usually denoted by P O∪I (·|XI ). It is an expectation operator with respect to a conditional probability (or mass function).
An important consequence of separate coherence is that
P O∪I (g|xI ) = P O∪I
(
g(·, xI )
∣∣xI) and P O∪I ( f g|XI ) = f P O∪I (g|XI ) (1)
for all xI ∈XI , all non-negative gambles f on XI and all gambles g on XO∪I [30, Theorems 6.2.4 and 6.2.6(l)]. The ﬁrst
equality tells us that P O∪I (·|xI ) is completely determined by its behaviour on L (XO ), and we will therefore often identify
P O∪I (·|xI ) with a lower prevision on L (XO ). To prove (1), observe that if h1(·, xI ) = h2(·, xI ) then it follows from SC1 that
P O∪I (h1 − h2|xI ) = P O∪I (h2 − h1|xI ) = 0, and therefore from SC3 that P O∪I (h1|xI ) = P O∪I (h2|xI ). The ﬁrst equality then
follows by letting h1 := g and h2 := g(·, xI ).
It is clear from SC1–SC3 that P O∪I (·|XI ) is separately coherent if and only if for all xI ∈ XI , P O∪I (·|xI ) is a coherent
lower prevision on L (XO ) and moreover condition (1) holds [this second condition turns out to be equivalent to requiring
that P O∪I ({xI }|xI ) = 1 for every xI ∈XI ].
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for all f ∈L (XI ). When I = ∅, separate coherence of P O∪I (·|XI ) = P O reduces to coherence of the unconditional lower
prevision P O .
2.4. The behavioural interpretation
The coherence concepts introduced above may be better understood in terms of the behavioural interpretation of (condi-
tional) lower previsions.6 If we see a gamble f as an uncertain reward, then the lower prevision P ( f ) can be interpreted as
a subject’s supremum acceptable price for buying the gamble f , in the sense that it is the supremum real μ such that she
considers the transaction f −μ, which is equivalent to buying f for a price μ, to be desirable. It follows that she considers
it desirable to buy f for any price P ( f ) − ε, ε > 0. Similarly, we can regard her upper prevision P ( f ) for f her inﬁmum
acceptable selling price for f , in the sense that it is the inﬁmum real μ such that she considers the transaction μ − f ,
which is equivalent to selling f for a price μ, to be desirable. In particular, she considers it desirable to sell f for any price
P ( f ) + ε, ε > 0. And a linear prevision P ( f ) corresponds to the case where her supremum acceptable buying price for the
gamble f coincides with her inﬁmum acceptable selling price, meaning that she expresses a preference between buying
and selling the gamble f for a price μ for almost all prices μ.
If we follow this interpretation, we can similarly interpret a subject’s conditional lower prevision for a gamble f condi-
tional on a value xI as her current supremum acceptable buying price for f if she were to ﬁnd out (at some later point)
that XI = xI .
A coherent unconditional lower prevision P is one for which we cannot raise the supremum acceptable buying price
P ( f ) for any gamble f by taking into account the implications of other desirable transactions. A separately coherent condi-
tional lower prevision P O∪I (·|XI ) is one where a similar requirement holds for every conditioning event XI = xI , and where
moreover our subject is currently disposed to betting at all odds on the event XI = xI if she were to observe it at some
later point.
2.5. Coherence and weak coherence
We now turn from separate to joint coherence. For any gamble f on XO∪I and any xI ∈XI , we deﬁne
GO∪I ( f |xI ) := I{xI }
[
f − P O∪I ( f |XI )
]= I{xI }[ f (·, xI ) − P O∪I( f (·, xI )∣∣xI)]
and
GO∪I ( f |XI ) := f − P O∪I ( f |XI ) =
∑
xI∈XI
G O∪I ( f |xI ) =
∑
xI∈XI
I{xI }
[
f (·, xI ) − P O∪I
(
f (·, xI )
∣∣xI)].
Taking into account the behavioural interpretation of conditional lower previsions summarised in Section 2.4, we may regard
GO∪I ( f |xI ) as an almost-desirable gamble, in the sense that for every ε > 0, the gamble GO∪I ( f |xI ) + εI{xI } corresponds to
buying f for a price P O∪I ( f |xI )+ ε, contingent on the event {xI }. And since taking ﬁnite sums of almost-desirable gambles
produces almost-desirable gambles, so should GO∪I ( f |XI ) be.
Observe that GO∪I ( f |XI ) is always equal to 0 when O = ∅. We also deﬁne, for any gamble f on XO∪I , the XI -support
suppI ( f ) of f as the set of elements of XI where the partial gamble f (·, xI ) is non-zero:
suppI ( f ) :=
{
xI ∈XI : I{xI } f = 0
}= {xI ∈XI : f (·, xI ) = 0}.
This support suppI ( f ) is a subset of XI , but as we already mentioned before, it will be convenient to identify it with the
subset suppI ( f ) ×XN\I of XN .
Consider disjoint subsets O j and I j of N . A collection of (separately coherent) conditional linear previsions P O j∪I j (·|XI j )
deﬁned on the sets of gambles L (XO j∪I j ), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, is called (strongly) coherent if for all f j ∈ L (XO j∪I j ), j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, there is some zN ∈⋃mj=1 suppI j ( f j) such that:[
m∑
j=1
GO j∪I j ( f j|XI j )
]
(zN) 0. (2)
The (separately coherent) conditional lower previsions P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) deﬁned on the sets of gambles L (XO j∪I j ), j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, are called coherent if and only if they are lower envelopes of a collection {PλO j∪I j (·|XI j ): λ ∈ Λ} of coherent con-
ditional linear previsions. This is equivalent to requiring that for all f j ∈L (XO j∪I j ) where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
all xIk ∈XIk and all g ∈L (XOk∪Ik ), there is some zN ∈ {xIk } ∪
⋃m
j=1 suppI j ( f j) such that:
6 See Refs. [30,32] for more details.
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m∑
j=1
GO j∪I j ( f j|XI j ) − GOk∪Ik (g|xIk )
]
(zN) 0. (3)
We say that the conditional lower previsions P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) are weakly coherent if for all f j ∈ L (XO j∪I j ) where j ∈{1, . . . ,m}, all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, all xIk ∈XIk and all g ∈L (XOk∪Ik ), there is some zN ∈XN such that:[
m∑
j=1
GO j∪I j ( f j|XI j ) − GOk∪Ik (g|xIk )
]
(zN) 0.
This condition requires that our subject should not be able to raise her supremum acceptable buying price P Ok∪Ik (g|xIk ) for
a gamble g contingent on {xIk } by taking into account the implications of other conditional assessments. However, under
the behavioural interpretation, a collection of weakly coherent conditional lower previsions can still present some forms of
inconsistency with one another. See Refs. [30, Chapter 7], [22] and [31] for discussion. These inconsistencies are eliminated
by the stronger notion of coherence given by Eq. (3), where we focus only on the elements in the supports of the gambles.
If the conditional lower previsions P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) are coherent, then they are clearly also weakly coherent. The following
characterisation of weak coherence will be useful. The equivalence between the ﬁrst two statements was proved in Ref. [24,
Theorem 1], while the equivalence between the second and third statements is a consequence of Ref. [30, Section 6.5.4].
Theorem 1. The conditional lower previsions P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, are weakly coherent if and only if there is some coherent
lower prevision P N onL (XN ) satisfying any (and hence all) of the following equivalent conditions:
(a) P N and P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, are weakly coherent;
(b) For all j = 1, . . . ,m, P N and P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) are pairwise coherent;
(c) For all j = 1, . . . ,m, all xI j ∈XI j and all gambles f onXO j∪I j :
P N
(
GO j∪I j ( f |xI j )
)= 0. (GBR)
The last condition in this theorem is called the Generalised Bayes Rule, and reduces to Bayes’s rule in the case of linear
conditional and unconditional previsions. A consequence of (GBR) in our context is that
P N
(
P O j∪I j ( f |XI j )
)
 P N( f ) P N
(
P O j∪I j ( f |XI j )
)
for every gamble f onXO j∪I j . (4)
We will also use the following result in our argumentation.
Theorem 2. (See Reduction Theorem [30, Theorem 7.1.5].) Let P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) be separately coherent conditional lower previsions de-
ﬁned on the sets of gamblesL (XO j∪I j ) with I j = ∅ for all j = 1, . . . ,m, and let P N be a coherent lower prevision onL (XN ). Then
P N and P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, are coherent if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(a) P N and P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, are weakly coherent;
(b) P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, are coherent.
2.6. Natural and regular extension
Let P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) be coherent conditional lower previsions deﬁned on the sets of gambles L (XO j∪I j ), j = 1, . . . ,m. If
we now consider any disjoint subsets O and I of N , the natural extension P O∪I (·|XI ) of these conditional lower previsions
is deﬁned on L (XO∪I ) by
EO∪I ( f |xI ) := sup
{
μ:
[
m∑
j=1
GO j∪I j (g j|XI j ) − I{xI }( f − μ)
]
< 0 on {xI } ∪
m⋃
j=1
suppI j (g j) for some g j ∈L (XO j∪I j )
}
for all f ∈L (XO∪I ) and all xI ∈XI . EO∪I ( f |xI ) represents the supremum acceptable buying price for a gamble f con-
tingent on {xI } that can be derived from the assessments in P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, using arguments of coherence. See
Refs. [30, Chapter 8], [22] and [31] for additional information.
In particular, the unconditional natural extension of P O j∪I j (·|XI j ), j = 1, . . . ,m, is given by
EN( f ) := sup
{
min
[
f −
m∑
j=1
GO j∪I j (g j|XI j )
]
: g j ∈L (XO j∪I j )
}
, (5)
for all gambles f on XN , and it is the pointwise smallest coherent lower prevision that is coherent with the P O j∪I j (·|XI j ),
j = 1, . . . ,m.
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Consider a subset I of N , and a coherent lower prevision P N on XN . The natural extension EN (·|XI ) of P N to a lower
prevision on L (XN ) conditional on XI is given by
EN( f |xI ) =
{
max{μ ∈ R: P N(I{xI }[ f − μ]) 0} if P N({xI }) > 0,
minzN\I∈XN\I f (zN\I , xI ) if P N({xI }) = 0.
It deﬁnes a separately coherent conditional lower prevision that is also coherent with P N , and it is indeed the smallest such
conditional lower prevision.
On the other hand, the regular extension R(·|XI ) of P N to a lower prevision on L (XN ) conditional on XI is given by
RN( f |xI ) :=
{
max{μ ∈ R: P N(I{xI }[ f − μ]) 0} if P N({xI }) > 0,
minzN\I∈XN\I f (zN\I , xI ) if P N({xI }) = 0.
The natural and regular extensions coincide unless P N ({xI }) > P N ({xI }) = 0, in which case we may have RN ( f |xI ) >
EN ( f |xI ). In fact, when P N ({xI }) > 0 there is a unique value of P N ( f |xI ) satisfying (GBR) with respect to P N , but this
is no longer true if P N ({xI }) = 0. See Refs. [22,25] for additional information.
The regular extension deﬁnes a separately coherent conditional lower prevision that is also coherent with P N , and we
will have occasion to use it as a tool for deriving conditional lower previsions from unconditional ones. The following result,
which follows from Theorem 6 in Ref. [22], makes regular extension especially useful in this respect:
Theorem 3. Let P N be a coherent lower prevision onL (XN ). Consider disjoint O j and I j for j = 1, . . . ,m. Assume that P N ({xI j }) >
0 for all xI j ∈XI j , and deﬁne P O j∪I j (·|XI j ) using regular extension for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then P N is coherent with the conditional lower
previsions P O 1∪I1 (·|XI1), . . . , P Om∪Im (·|XIm ).
3. The formal approach to independence
3.1. Basic deﬁnitions
Consider a number of (logically independent) variables Xn , n ∈ N , assuming values in the respective ﬁnite sets Xn . Here
N is some ﬁnite index set. We assume that for each of these variables Xn , we have an uncertainty model for the values that
it assumes in Xn , in the form of a coherent lower prevision Pn on the set L (Xn) of all gambles (real-valued maps) on
Xn .
We begin our discussion of independence by following the formalist route: we introduce a number of interesting gener-
alisations of the notion of an independent product of linear previsions.
The ﬁrst is a stronger, symmetrised version of the notion of ‘forward factorisation’ that was introduced elsewhere [12].
Deﬁnition 1 (Productivity). Consider a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). We call this lower prevision productive if
for all disjoint subsets7 I and O of N , all g ∈L (XO ) and all non-negative f ∈L (XI ), P N ( f [g − P N (g)]) 0.
The intuition behind this deﬁnition is that a coherent lower prevision P N is productive if multiplying an almost-desirable
gamble on XO (the gamble g − P N (g), which has lower prevision zero) with any non-negative gamble f that depends on a
different variable XI , preserves its almost-desirability, in the sense that the lower prevision of the product is non-negative.
In other words, if we construct a gamble on XO∪I by piecing together almost-desirable gambles from L (XO ), we obtain
a gamble that is still almost-desirable.
A lower envelope P N of productive coherent lower previsions Pλ , λ ∈ Λ, is again productive: for all disjoint subsets I
and O of N , all g ∈L (XO ) and all non-negative f ∈L (XI ), we have that Pλ( f [g− P N (g)]) Pλ( f [g− Pλ(g)]) 0, and
therefore indeed P N ( f [g − P N (g)]) 0.
In the paper [12] on laws of large numbers for coherent lower previsions, which generalises and subsumes most known
versions in the literature, we have proved that the condition for forward irrelevance8 (which is implied by the present
productivity condition) is suﬃcient for a weak law of large numbers to hold. So we are led to the following immediate
conclusion.
Theorem 4 (Weak law of large numbers). (See [12, Theorem 2].) Let the coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) be productive. Let
ε > 0 and consider arbitrary gambles hn on Xn, n ∈ N. Let B be a common bound for the ranges of these gambles and let minhn 
mn  P N (hn) P N (hn) Mn maxhn for all n ∈ N. Then
7 The coherence of PN guarantees that for empty I or O the corresponding condition is trivially satisﬁed.
8 This condition is a particular instance of the epistemic irrelevance we discuss in Section 4: if we consider n variables X1, . . . , Xn , then for all k = 2, . . . ,n
the variables X1, . . . , Xk−1 are epistemically irrelevant to Xk . See Refs. [12,13] for more information.
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({
xN ∈XN :
∑
n∈N
mn
|N| − ε 
∑
n∈N
hn(xn)
|N| 
∑
n∈N
Mn
|N| + ε
})
 1− 2exp
(
−|N|ε
2
4B2
)
.
Next comes a version of a condition that has proved quite useful in the context of research on credal networks [11],
which we shall discuss in Section 8.
Deﬁnition 2 (Factorisation). Consider a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). We call this lower prevision
(i) factorising9 if for all o ∈ N and all I ⊆ N \ {o},10 all fo ∈L (Xo) and all non-negative f i ∈L (Xi), i ∈ I , P N ( f I fo) =
P N ( f I P N ( fo)), where f I :=∏i∈I f i ;
(ii) strongly factorising if P N( f g) = P N ( f P N(g)) for all g ∈ L (XO ) and non-negative f ∈ L (XI ), where I and O are
any11 disjoint subsets of N .
It will at this point be useful to introduce the following notation. Consider a real interval a := [a,a] and a real number b,
then
a
 b :=
{
ab if b 0,
ab if b 0.
Also, we denote by P ( f ) the interval [P ( f ), P ( f )].
It follows from the coherence of P N that given a factorising (respectively strongly factorising) coherent lower prevision
we also get P N ( f I P N ( fo)) = P N ( f I ) 
 P N ( fo) (respectively P N ( f P N (g)) = P N ( f ) 
 P N (g)) in Deﬁnition 2. We then have
the following characterisations of factorising lower previsions, based on their coherence and conjugacy properties.
Proposition 5. A coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) is factorising if and only if for all o ∈ N, all fo ∈ L (Xo) and all non-
negative fi ∈L (Xi), i ∈ N \ {o}, any (and hence all) of the following equivalent conditions holds:
(i) P N (
∏
n∈N fn) = P N (P N( fo)
∏
i∈N\{o} f i) = P N (
∏
i∈N\{o} f i) 
 P N ( fo);
(ii) P N (
∏
n∈N fn) =
{
P N ( fo)
∏
i∈N\{o} P N ( f i) if P N ( fo) 0,
P N ( fo)
∏
i∈N\{o} P N ( f i) if P N ( fo) 0.
The difference between factorisation and strong factorisation lies in the types of products considered: in the ﬁrst case,
we only consider gambles that are products of non-negative gambles each depending on a single variable, while in the
second case the non-negative gamble considered need not be such a product.
Finally, there is the property that the late Russian mathematician Vladimir Kuznetsov ﬁrst drew attention to [19]. In
order to deﬁne it, we use  to denote the (commutative and associative) interval product operator deﬁned by:
[a,b] [c,d] := {xy: x ∈ [a,b] and y ∈ [c,d]}
= [min{ac,ad,bc,bd},max{ac,ad,bc,bd}] for all a b and c  d in R.
Deﬁnition 3 (Kuznetsov product). Consider a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). We call this lower prevision
(i) a Kuznetsov product, or simply, Kuznetsov, if P N (
∏
n∈N fn) =n∈N P N ( fn) for all fn ∈L (Xn), n ∈ N;
(ii) a strong Kuznetsov product, or simply, strongly Kuznetsov, if P N ( f g) = P N ( f )  P N (g) for all g ∈ L (XO ) and all f ∈
L (XI ), where I and O are any disjoint subsets of N .11
These two properties are based on the sensitivity analysis interpretation of coherent lower previsions: if we consider a
product of gambles and for each of gamble we have an interval of possible values for its expectation, the Kuznetsov property
implies that the interval of possible values for the expectation of the product coincides with the product of the intervals of
the expectations of the different gambles. As before, the difference between being a Kuznetsov product and being a strong
Kuznetsov product resides in whether the gambles we are multiplying depend on one variable only or on several variables
at once.
We will show later that all the properties introduced above generalise the factorisation property of precise probabilities
to the imprecise case. Here are the general relationships between them:
9 The present notion of factorisation when restricted to lower probabilities and events, is called strict factorisation in Ref. [29].
10 The coherence of PN guarantees that for empty I the corresponding condition is trivially satisﬁed.
11 The coherence of PN guarantees that for empty I or O the corresponding condition is trivially satisﬁed.
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P N is strongly Kuznetsov ⇒ P N is strongly factorising ⇒ P N is productive
⇓ ⇓
P N is Kuznetsov ⇒ P N is factorising.
The intuition behind these implications is the following (see Appendix A for a detailed proof). On the one hand, being
strongly Kuznetsov clearly implies being Kuznetsov, and strong factorisation implies factorisation, because we allow for more
involved products of gambles in the deﬁnition of the former. On the other hand, the factorisation conditions focus on the
lower prevision only, whereas the Kuznetsov ones involve both lower and the upper previsions, and therefore give rise to
stronger conditions. And ﬁnally, it follows from its deﬁnition that a strongly factorising coherent lower prevision satisﬁes
the condition of productivity with equality instead of with inequality.
In Appendix B we present examples showing that the converses of the implications in this proposition do not hold in
general. Speciﬁcally, in Example 3 we give a coherent lower prevision that satisﬁes productivity but none of the other prop-
erties; in Example 5 we give a coherent lower prevision that is strongly factorising (and as a consequence also factorising
and productive) but not Kuznetsov (and therefore not strongly Kuznetsov); and in Example 6 we have a factorising coherent
lower prevision that satisﬁes none of the other properties. The only related open problem at this point is whether being
Kuznetsov is generally equivalent to being strongly Kuznetsov.
We will show that the independent natural extension from Section 5 is strongly factorising but not Kuznetsov in general.
In the rest of this section, we look at a number of special cases that will prove instrumental in what follows. In particular,
the strong product we will study in Section 3.3 satisﬁes all the properties we have introduced here.
3.2. The product of linear previsions
If we have linear previsions Pn on L (Xn) with corresponding mass functions pn , then their product SN :=×n∈N Pn is
the linear prevision on L (XN ) deﬁned as
SN( f ) =
∑
xN∈XN
f (xN)
∏
n∈N
pn(xn) for all f ∈L (XN ). (6)
For any non-empty subset R of N , we also denote by SR :=×r∈R Pr the product of the linear previsions Pr , r ∈ R .
Useful, and immediate, are the following marginalisation and associativity properties of the product of linear previsions.
They imply that for linear previsions all the properties introduced in Section 3.1 coincide.
Proposition 7. Consider arbitrary linear previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N.
(i) For any non-empty subset R of N, SR is theXR -marginal of SN : SN (g) = SR(g) for all gambles g onXR ;
(ii) For any partition N1 and N2 of N,×n∈N1∪N2 Pn = (×n∈N1 Pn) × (×n∈N2 Pn), or in other words, SN = SN1 × SN2 .
Moreover, for any linear prevision PN onL (XN ), the following statements are equivalent:
(a) PN =×n∈N Pn is the product of its marginals Pn;
(b) PN(
∏
n∈N fn) =
∏
n∈N Pn( fn) for all fn ∈L (Xn), n ∈ N;
(c) PN is strongly Kuznetsov;
(d) PN is Kuznetsov;
(e) PN is strongly factorising;
(f) PN is factorising;
(g) PN is productive.
3.3. The strong product of coherent lower previsions
In a similar vein, if we have coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), then their so-called strong product [30, Sec-
tion 9.3.5]12 SN :=×n∈N Pn is deﬁned as the coherent lower prevision on L (XN ) that is the lower envelope of the set of
independent products {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈M (Pn)}, or equivalently, of the set {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))}.
So for every f ∈L (XN ):
12 Walley [30, Section 9.3.5] calls this lower prevision the type-1 product. The term ‘strong product’ seems to go back to Cozman [3].
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{×
n∈N
Pn( f ): (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈M (Pn)
}
(7)
= inf
{×
n∈N
Pn( f ): (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext
(
M (Pn)
)}
. (8)
For any non-empty subset R of N , we also denote by SR :=×r∈R Pr the strong product of the coherent lower previsions
Pr , r ∈ R . Like the product of linear previsions, the strong product of lower previsions satisﬁes the following marginalisation
and associativity properties, and also all the properties deﬁned in Section 3.1:13
Proposition 8. Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N.
(i) For any non-empty subset R of N, SR is theXR -marginal of SN : SN (g) = SR(g) for all gambles g onXR ;
(ii) ext(M (SN )) = {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))};
(iii) For any partition N1 and N2 of N,×n∈N1∪N2 Pn = (×n∈N1 Pn) × (×n∈N2 Pn), or in other words, SN = SN1 × SN2 ;
(iv) The strong product SN is strongly Kuznetsov, and therefore also Kuznetsov, strongly factorising, factorising and productive.
The nice characterisation of the set ext(M (SN )) in the second statement guarantees that the inﬁma in Eqs. (7) and (8)
are actually minima. This set of extreme points may be inﬁnite even when dealing with ﬁnite Xn , n ∈ N , and therefore
hence the second statement is not immediate. In addition, this result guarantees, amongst other things, that the strong
product satisﬁes the weak law of large numbers of Theorem 4.
This marks a preliminary end to our formalist discussion of independence for coherent lower previsions. In the next
section, we turn to the treatment of independence following an epistemic and coherentist approach, where independence is
considered to be an assessment a subject makes. The more formalist thread will be taken up again in Section 6.
4. Epistemic irrelevance and independence
Consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N . We say that a subject judges that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO when
she assumes that learning which value XI assumes in XI will not affect her beliefs about XO . Taking into account the
behavioural interpretation of coherent lower previsions summarised in Section 2.4, this means that the subject’s supremum
acceptable buying price for a gamble f contingent on the event that XI = xI coincides with her supremum acceptable
buying price for f , irrespective of the value xI ∈XI that is observed.
Now assume that our subject has a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). If she assesses that XI is epistemically
irrelevant to XO , this implies that she can infer from her joint model P N the following conditional model P O∪I (·|XI ) on
the set L (XO∪I ):
P O∪I (h|xI ) := P N
(
h(·, xI )
)
for all gambles h onXO∪I and all xI ∈XI .
So an assessment of epistemic irrelevance is useful because it allows us to derive conditional lower previsions from uncon-
ditional ones. It follows from the comments in Section 2 that such an assessment is trivial when either O or I is the empty
set. Similarly, if the gamble h depends only on XO , then the conditional lower prevision for h conditional on some value
xI ∈XI coincides with the unconditional lower prevision of h.
It should be clear from the previous discussion that epistemic irrelevance is an asymmetric notion: we only require that
XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO ; and this does not necessarily imply that XO should be epistemically irrelevant to XI .
Refs. [6,13] include thorough discussions of this point, along with examples illustrating how such asymmetries may appear
in concrete cases. Because of this, it becomes necessary to pay special attention to the mutual irrelevance of two or more
variables. We then talk about epistemic independence, a suitably symmetrised version of epistemic irrelevance.
4.1. Epistemic many-to-many independence
We say that a subject judges the variables Xn , n ∈ N , to be epistemically many-to-many independent when she assumes
that learning the value of any number of these variables will not affect her beliefs about the others. In other words, if she
judges for any disjoint subsets I and O of N that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO .
Again, if our subject has a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ), and she assesses that the variables Xn , n ∈ N , are
epistemically many-to-many independent, then she can infer from her joint model P N a family of conditional models
I (P N) :=
{
P O∪I (·|XI ): I and O disjoint subsets of N
}
,
where P O∪I (·|XI ) is the coherent lower prevision on L (XO∪I ) given by:
13 For the case of two variables (N = {1,2}), Cozman [3] was the ﬁrst to prove that the strong product is Kuznetsov.
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(
h(·, xI )
)
for all gambles h onXO∪I and all xI ∈XI .
The crucial idea that the arguments in this paper hinge on, is that a coherent lower prevision P N expresses independence
when it does not lead to incoherence when combined with an assessment of epistemic independence: the lower prevision
P N and the conditional supremum acceptable buying prices derived from it using epistemic independence should not violate
the consistency conditions introduced in Section 2.
Deﬁnition 4 (Many-to-many independence). A coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) is called many-to-many independent
if it is coherent with the family of conditional lower previsions I (P N ). For a collection of coherent lower previsions Pn
on L (Xn), n ∈ N , any many-to-many independent coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) that coincides with the Pn on
their domains L (Xn), n ∈ N , is called a many-to-many independent product of these marginals.
As we show in the following example, this requirement of coherence of the unconditional and resulting conditional
models is by no means trivial: not all coherent lower previsions P N express—are compatible with an assessment of—
epistemic independence.
Example 1 (Independence is not trivial). Consider X1 = X2 = {0,1}, and let P {1,2} be the linear prevision determined by
P {1,2}({(0,0)}) = P {1,2}({(1,1)}) = 12 . Consider the gamble f := I{1} on X1, so P {1,2}( f ) = 12 . On the other hand, with x2 = 1,
we get
P {1,2}
(
I{x2}
[
f − P {1,2}( f )
])= 1
2
− 1
2
· 1
2
= 1
4
= 0.
This shows that P {1,2} is not coherent with the conditional prevision P {1,2}(·|X2), and as a consequence it is not many-to-
many independent. 
That a coherent lower prevision is not a many-to-many independent product need not mean that it cannot be coherently
updated: in the case of Example 1, we can always do so by applying Bayes’s rule. What it does mean is that it cannot be
coherently updated in such a way that at the same time the epistemic independence conditions are satisﬁed.
We shall see examples further on that seem to suggest that being a many-to-many independent product might be too
weak a requirement in certain situations: Example 3 in Appendix B establishes the existence of a non-vacuous many-to-
many independent product with vacuous marginals, and intuition might suggest that an independent product of vacuous
marginals should be vacuous. The reason why such examples exist, is that coherence with the conditional lower previsions
induced by the marginals can sometimes be very easy to satisfy, as Proposition 26 further on will show. Because of this, it
might be thought useful to require, in addition, some of the factorisation conditions from Section 3. We come back to this
issue in the Conclusions.
4.2. Epistemic many-to-one independence
There is a weaker notion of independence that we will consider here, which is mainly useful as a kind of catalyst,
facilitating our search for the many-to-many independent products we are really after. We will coin the term ‘epistemic
many-to-one independence’ to identify it. We say that a subject judges the variables Xn , n ∈ N , to be epistemically many-to-
one independent when she assumes that learning the value of any number of these variables will not affect her beliefs about
any single other. In other words, if she judges for any o ∈ N and any subset I of N \ {o} that XI is epistemically irrelevant to
Xo .
Once again, if our subject has a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ), and she assesses that the variables Xn , n ∈ N ,
are epistemically many-to-one independent, then she can infer from her joint model P N a family of conditional models
N (Pn,n ∈ N) :=
{
P {o}∪I (·|XI ): o ∈ N and I ⊆ N \ {o}
}
,
where P {o}∪I (·|XI ) is the coherent lower prevision on L (X{o}∪I ) given by:
P {o}∪I (h|xI ) := P N
(
h(·, xI )
)= Po(h(·, xI )) for all h ∈L (X{o}∪I ) and xI ∈XI , (9)
where of course Po is the Xo-marginal lower prevision of P N . In the set N (Pn,n ∈ N) we are also allowing for empty I , in
which case the conditional lower prevision P {o}∪I (·|XI ) reduces to the marginal Po . So we see that the family of conditional
lower previsions N (Pn,n ∈ N) only depends on the joint model P N through its Xn-marginals Pn , n ∈ N (which, of course,
explains our notation for it). This allows us, in particular, to deﬁne the family N (Pn,n ∈ N) also starting from coherent
lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), rather than from a joint P N . The distinction between the two cases will be clear from the
context. We use this observation in the deﬁnition of the many-to-one independent product of given marginals:
Deﬁnition 5. A coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) with marginals Pn,n ∈ N , is called many-to-one independent if it is
coherent with the family N (Pn,n ∈ N). For a collection of coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N , any coherent
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of these lower previsions Pn .
If a coherent lower prevision P N is many-to-many independent, then it is also many-to-one independent: if P N is
coherent with the family I (P N ), it is certainly also coherent with the subfamily N (Pn,n ∈ N) of I (P N ). Trivially, both
conditions are equivalent when N = {1,2}, and as a consequence we can also use Example 1 to conclude that also many-to-
one independence is not trivial. However, many-to-many and many-to-one independence are generally not equivalent when
the set N has more than two elements: an explicit example is provided in Example 6 in Appendix B.
Any many-to-one independent product of the coherent lower previsions Pn , n ∈ N , must have these lower previsions as
its marginals. This follows by applying the coherence condition in particular to the pairs P N and P {n}∪∅(·|X∅), as will be
made explicit in Corollary 15.
4.3. Useful basic properties
A basic coherence result [30, Theorem 7.1.6] states that taking lower envelopes of a family of coherent conditional lower
previsions produces coherent conditional lower previsions. As a consequence, if we consider a family PλN , λ ∈ Λ, of many-
to-one independent products, then for each λ the lower prevision PλN is coherent with the family of conditional lower
previsions N (Pλn,n ∈ N). By taking lower envelopes, we deduce that P N := infλ∈Λ PλN is coherent with the lower envelopes
of N (Pλn,n ∈ N), which are precisely the family N (Pn,n ∈ N) of conditional lower previsions that can be derived from P N
using epistemic irrelevance: the marginal lower previsions of P N are the lower envelopes of the marginal lower previsions
of PλN . Hence, P N is also a many-to-one independent product. A similar argument shows that many-to-many independence
is preserved by taking lower envelopes.
We also have the following marginalisation and associativity properties.
Proposition 9. Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N. Let P N be any many-to-one independent product and Q N any
many-to-many independent product of the marginals Pn, n ∈ N. Let R and S be any subsets of N.
(i) TheXR -marginal P R of P N is a many-to-one independent product of its marginals P r , r ∈ R;
(ii) TheXR -marginal Q R of Q N is a many-to-many independent product of its marginals P r , r ∈ R;
(iii) If R and S constitute a partition of N, then Q N is a many-to-many independent product of its XR -marginal Q R and its XS -
marginal Q S .
The associativity property in (iii) follows immediately from the deﬁnition of a many-to-many independent product, and
means that the joint model still satisﬁes many-to-many independence with respect to the marginals Q R and Q S ; we
have established a similar property for strong independence in Proposition 8. To see that an analogous property does not
generally hold for many-to-one products, consider the coherent lower prevision Q N in Example 6 in Appendix B.
To conclude, we consider the case where all the lower previsions we want to combine into an independent joint model
are actually linear previsions. The following result shows that our deﬁnitions of many-to-one and many-to-many indepen-
dent products extend the existing ones for linear previsions. It will also provide the basis for Proposition 12, which will
allow us to kick-start the discussion in Section 5.
Proposition 10. Any linear previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N, have a unique many-to-many independent product and a unique many-
to-one independent product, and both are equal to the (strong) product SN :=×n∈N Pn.
4.4. Conditional independence
Besides the variables Xn , n ∈ N , considered so far, we now consider another variable Y assuming values in a ﬁnite set Y .
We assume the variables XN and Y to be logically independent: the variable (XN , Y ) can assume all values in the Cartesian
product XN ×Y .
We also consider separately coherent conditional lower previsions P O∪I (·|XI , Y ) on L (XO∪I ×Y ) where I and O are
disjoint subsets of N . It is important to realise that in all these conditional lower previsions, the variable Y consistently appears as a
conditioning variable.
We can use this set-up to generalise the notions of epistemic irrelevance and independence to those of conditional
epistemic irrelevance and independence. As an example, consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N . We say that a subject
judges that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO , conditional on Y , when she assumes that when knowing the value of Y , learning
in addition which value XI assumes in XI will not affect her beliefs about XO .
Assume that our subject has a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P N (·|Y ) on L (XN × Y ). If she as-
sesses that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO conditional on Y , this implies that she can infer from her model P N (·|Y ) a
conditional model P O∪I (·|XI , Y ) on the set L (XO∪I ×Y ) given by
P O∪I (h|xI , y) := P N
(
h(·, xI , y)
∣∣y) for all h ∈L (XO∪I ×Y ) and all (xI , y) ∈XI ×Y .
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from doing so explicitly, or in any detail. Rather, we present a result that simply reduces problems of conditional epistemic
irrelevance and independence, as formulated above, to a collection of problems of epistemic irrelevance and independence.
This will allow us to immediately and automatically extend all the results in this and the next section from the case of
independence to that of independence conditional on the additional variable Y .
With any conditional lower prevision P O∪I (·|XI , Y ) on L (XO∪I ×Y ), we associate a collection of (separately coherent)
conditional lower previsions Q yO∪I (·|XI ) on L (XO∪I ), one for each y in Y , deﬁned by
Q yO∪I ( f |xI ) := P O∪I ( f |xI , y) = P O∪I
(
f (·, xI )
∣∣xI , y) for all f ∈L (XO∪I ) and xI ∈XI . (10)
We can reduce the problem of checking the coherence of a collection of conditional lower previsions P Ok∪Ik (·|XIk , Y ),
k = 1, . . . ,m, to a number |Y | of coherence problems that are simpler, in the sense that the conditioning variable Y
disappears from them; we have, for each y ∈Y , to check the coherence of the collection Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ), k = 1, . . . ,m.
Theorem 11 (Elimination of common conditioning variables). Consider m arbitrary but different pairs of disjoint subsets Ok and Ik of
N, k = 1, . . . ,m. Consider separately coherent conditional lower previsions P Ok∪Ik (·|XIk , Y ) onL (XOk∪Ik ×Y ), k = 1, . . . ,m, and
for each y ∈Y , the corresponding separately coherent Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ) on L (XOk∪Ik ), k = 1, . . . ,m. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The collection P Ok∪Ik (·|XIk , Y ), k = 1, . . . ,m, is coherent;
(ii) For each y inY , the collection Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ), k = 1, . . . ,m, is coherent.
5. Independent natural extension
A number of examples in Appendix B show that, when we leave linear for lower previsions, many-to-one and many-to-
many independent products are generally speaking not unique.
What we want to do in this section, then, is to show that any collection of coherent marginals always has a pointwise
smallest many-to-one, and a pointwise smallest many-to-many, independent product, and that these products coincide.
We begin by observing that there always is at least one many-to-many (and therefore also many-to-one) independent
product:
Proposition 12. Consider coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N. Then their strong product×n∈N Pn is a many-to-many
and many-to-one independent product of the marginals Pn.
5.1. Deﬁnition of the many-to-one independent natural extension
Although the notion of epistemic many-to-many independence seems to be the more intuitively appealing and useful of
the two, it turns out to be easier to approach the study with many-to-one independent products. So, for the time being, we
concentrate on the latter notion of independence, which is related to the collection of conditional lower previsions:
N (Pn,n ∈ N) =
{
P {o}∪I (·|XI ): o ∈ N and I ⊆ N \ {o}
}
,
where the conditional lower previsions are given by Eq. (9). Proposition 12 is instrumental in establishing the following
crucial observation.
Proposition 13. Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N. Then the collectionN (Pn,n ∈ N) of conditional
lower previsions P {o}∪I (·|XI ) is coherent.
As an immediate consequence, we see that checking whether a joint lower prevision is a many-to-one independent
product is a fairly straightforward matter.
Corollary 14. Consider a coherent lower prevision P N onL (XN ), and coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N. Then P N is a
many-to-one independent product of the Pn, n ∈ N, if and only if any (and hence all) of the following equivalent conditions is satisﬁed:
(i) P N is weakly coherent with the collectionN (Pn,n ∈ N) of conditional lower previsions P {o}∪I (·|XI );
(ii) P N (I{xI }[g − Po(g)]) = 0 for all o ∈ N, all I ⊆ N \ {o}, all gambles g onXo and all xI ∈XI .
If we apply condition (ii) in this corollary to the special case where I is the empty set, we deduce immediately that any
(many-to-one) independent product of a number of lower previsions must have these lower previsions as its marginals:
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many-to-one independent product of these lower previsions Pn, then for all n ∈ N, Pn is theXn-marginal of P N : P N (g) = Pn(g) for
all gambles g onXn.
Because all the sets Xn are ﬁnite, we can invoke Walley’s Finite Extension Theorem [30, Theorem 8.1.9] to derive from
Proposition 13 that there always is a pointwise smallest joint coherent lower prevision EN that is coherent with the coherent
family N (Pn,n ∈ N). This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (Many-to-one independent natural extension). Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N .
We call the pointwise smallest coherent lower prevision that is coherent with the family of conditional lower previsions
N (Pn,n ∈ N) the many-to-one independent natural extension of the marginals Pn , and we denote it by ⊗n∈N Pn , or alterna-
tively by EN when it is clear from the context what the marginals are.
Alternatively, and equivalently, the many-to-one independent natural extension of the marginals Pn is the pointwise
smallest many-to-one independent coherent lower prevision on L (XN ) whose marginals coincide with the given Pn . We
gather from Corollary 14 that
⊗
n∈N Pn is also the smallest coherent lower prevision that is weakly coherent with the
conditional lower previsions in N (Pn,n ∈ N).
Since the strong product×n∈N Pn is a many-to-one independent product of the marginals Pn , n ∈ N , by Proposition 12,
it has to dominate the many-to-one independent natural extension
⊗
n∈N Pn:×n∈N Pn ⊗n∈N Pn . These products do not
coincide in general: Walley [30, Section 9.3.4] discusses an example where the many-to-one independent natural extension
is not a lower envelope of independent linear products, and as a consequence cannot coincide with the strong product.
On the other hand, the strong product is not generally the greatest many-to-one independent product of given marginals,
as we show in Example 3 in Appendix B.
5.2. Immediate properties of the many-to-one independent natural extension
It will pay to study this many-to-one independent natural extension in greater detail. We begin by deriving a workable
expression for it. By deﬁnition, EN is the smallest joint coherent lower prevision on L (XN ) that is coherent with the family
of conditional lower previsions N (Pn,n ∈ N), so we can infer from Walley’s Finite Extension Theorem [30, Theorem 8.1.9]
that EN is the natural extension of the coherent collection N (Pn,n ∈ N) to an unconditional (joint) lower prevision. Using
Eq. (5), we ﬁnd that it is given by:
EN( f ) = sup
{
min
[
f −
∑
o∈N, I⊆N\{o}
G{o}∪I (gI,o|XI )
]
: gI,o ∈L (X{o}∪I ), o ∈ N, I ⊆ N \ {o}
}
,
for all gambles f on XN , where we let
G{o}∪I (gI,o|XI ) :=
∑
xI∈XI
I{xI }
[
gI,o − P {o}∪I (gi,o|XI )
]= ∑
xI∈XI
I{xI }
[
gI,o(·, xI ) − Po
(
gI,o(·, xI )
)]
.
Therefore we ﬁnd that:
EN( f ) = sup
gI,o∈L (X{o}∪I )
o∈N, I⊆N\{o}
min
zN∈XN
[
f (zN) −
∑
o∈N,I⊆N\{o}
[
gI,o(zo, zI ) − Po
(
gI,o(·, zI )
)]]
. (11)
We ﬁrst show that we can simplify this expression, by restricting the I in the supremum to their largest possible values.
Theorem 16. Consider coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N. Then for all gambles f onXN :
EN( f ) = sup
hn∈L (XN )
n∈N
min
zN∈XN
[
f (zN) −
∑
n∈N
[
hn(zN) − Pn
(
hn(·, zN\{n})
)]]
. (12)
The coherent lower prevision in Eq. (12) is actually the natural extension of the following coherent family of conditional
lower previsions:
Next(Pn,n ∈ N) :=
{
P {n}∪N\{n}(·|XN\{n}): n ∈ N
}⊆N (Pn,n ∈ N).
Relying on this expression for the independent natural extension, it is fairly straightforward to show that it has the following
monotonicity property.
Proposition 17. Let Pn and Q n be coherent lower previsions onL (Xn) such that Pn  Q n, n ∈ N. Then⊗n∈N Pn ⊗n∈N Q n.
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Let us consider the coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N . For any non-empty subset R of N , we denote the
independent natural extension of the marginal lower previsions Pr , r ∈ R , by ER =⊗r∈R Pr . This ER turns out to be the
XR -marginal of EN =⊗n∈N Pn .
Theorem 18. Consider a non-empty subset R of N. Then EN ( f ) = ER( f ) for all gambles f onXR .
The argumentation leading to this marginalisation property also allows us to prove the following result.
Proposition 19. EN is productive. Moreover, EN (I{xI }[g − EO (g)]) = 0 for all disjoint subsets I and O of N, all xI ∈ XI and all
g ∈L (XO ).
This implies that the independent natural extension EN satisﬁes the law of large numbers of Theorem 4. So does, therefore,
any (many-to-one or many-to-many) independent product of these marginals, as it must dominate EN , even though, as we show
in Appendix B, not all such independent products are productive!
Let us now deﬁne, for any disjoint subsets I and O of N , the conditional lower previsions EO∪I (·|XI ) on the set
L (XO∪I ) as follows:
EO∪I (h|xI ) := EN
(
h(·, xI )
)= EO (h(·, xI )) for all h ∈L (XO∪I ) and xI ∈XI , (13)
where the last equality follows from Theorem 18. This allows us to infer from the many-to-one independent natural exten-
sion EN a family of conditional models
I (EN) :=
{
EO∪I (·|XI ): I and O disjoint subsets of N
}
,
Interestingly, EN is coherent with the family I (EN ), and therefore:
Theorem 20. EN is a many-to-many independent product of the coherent lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N.
Since any many-to-many independent product is in particular also a many-to-one independent product, we are led to
the following immediate conclusion:
Theorem 21 (Independent natural extension). The many-to-one independent natural extension EN =⊗n∈N Pn of the coherent lower
previsions Pn, n ∈ N, is also their pointwise smallest many-to-many independent product. We can therefore simply call it the indepen-
dent natural extension of the marginals Pn.
The independent natural extension is not only a many-to-one and many-to-many independent product of its marginals:
it is also a factorising lower prevision.
Theorem 22. Consider coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N. Then their independent natural extension⊗n∈N Pn is fac-
torising.
To show that it is also strongly factorising, it seems easiest to ﬁrst show that it has an associativity property that is
similar to the one discussed in Propositions 8 and 9.
5.4. Associativity of the independent natural extension
Assume that N is the union of two disjoint sets N1 and N2. Then it is natural to ask whether taking the independent
natural extension is an associative operation, i.e., whether
⊗
n∈N1∪N2
Pn =
(⊗
n∈N1
Pn
)
⊗
(⊗
n∈N2
Pn
)
?
Let us look at this formulation from a slightly different angle. We can consider the tuple XN1 as a variable assuming values
in the set XN1 , and EN1 :=
⊗
n∈N1 Pn as the corresponding ‘marginal’ lower prevision on L (XN1 ). Similarly, we can
consider the tuple XN2 as a variable assuming values in XN2 , and EN2 :=
⊗
n∈N2 Pn as the corresponding ‘marginal’ lower
prevision on L (XN2 ). We now consider the joint variable X{N1,N2} assuming values in X{N1,N2} , and the independent
natural extension E{N1,N2} := EN1 ⊗ EN2 = (
⊗
n∈N1 Pn) ⊗ (
⊗
n∈N2 Pn) of these two ‘marginals’. Since the variable XN1∪N2 is
(essentially) the same as the variable X{N1,N2} , the natural question to ask is, whether EN1∪N2 = E{N1,N2}?
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n∈N1∪N2 Pn = (
⊗
n∈N1 Pn) ⊗ (
⊗
n∈N2 Pn).
One important and fairly immediate consequence of this associativity is that it allows us to derive from the factorising
character of the independent natural extension that it is also strongly factorising:
Theorem24. Consider coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N. Then their independent natural extension⊗n∈N Pn is strongly
factorising.
5.5. Interesting special cases
When some of the marginals are linear or vacuous, the expression for the independent natural extension in Eq. (12)
simpliﬁes to a great extent. Because of the associativity result in Theorem 23, it suﬃces to consider the case of two variables
X1 and X2, so we let N = {1,2}.
When one of the marginals is linear, all independent products coincide:
Proposition 25. Let P1 be any linear prevision onL (X1), and let P2 be any coherent lower prevision onL (X2). Let P {1,2} be any
independent product of P1 and P2 . Then for all gambles f onX1 ×X2:
P {1,2}( f ) = (P1 × P2)( f ) = (P1 ⊗ P2)( f ) = P2
(
P1( f )
)
,
where P1( f ) is the gamble onX2 deﬁned by P1( f )(x2) := P1( f (·, x2)) for all x2 ∈X2 .
On the other hand, when one of the marginals is vacuous, then the strong product and the independent natural extension
are also guaranteed to coincide:
Proposition 26. Let P A11 be the vacuous lower prevision on L (X1) relative to the non-empty set A1 ⊆ X1 , and let P2 be any
coherent lower prevision onL (X2). For all gambles f onX1 ×X2:
(i) (P A11 × P2)( f ) = (P A11 ⊗ P2)( f ) =minx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)).
(ii) If P is a factorising coherent lower prevision with these marginals, then
P ( f ) = (P A11 × P2)( f ) = (P A11 ⊗ P2)( f ) = minx1∈A1 P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)
.
(iii) If P2 = P A22 is the vacuous lower prevision onL (X2) relative to the non-empty set A2 ⊆X2 , then any coherent lower prevision
with these marginals P is an independent product of P A11 and P
A2
2 .
In contrast with what we might come to expect from Proposition 25, when one of the marginals is vacuous, we cannot
guarantee that all independent products coincide: see Example 3 in Appendix B. This implies that the second statement of
Proposition 26 cannot be extended from factorising coherent lower previsions to independent products.14
6. External additivity
We can now bring what we have learnt about the independent natural extension to bear on our discussion of the
more formalist approaches to independence. In the following section, we investigate the connections between epistemic
independence and factorisation. Here, we discuss weakened versions for lower previsions of the additivity property that all
linear previsions have. Vicig [29] discusses a related but weaker notion of external n-monotonicity for the case of coherent
lower probabilities.
Deﬁnition 7 (External additivity). Consider a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). We call this lower prevision:
(i) externally additive if for all non-empty R ⊆ N and all gambles fr on Xr , r ∈ R , P N (∑r∈R fr) =∑r∈R P N ( fr);
(ii) strongly externally additive if P N ( f + g) = P N ( f ) + P N (g) for all f ∈L (XI ) and g ∈L (XO ), where I and O are any
disjoint subsets15 of N .
14 It also explains why the lower prevision in Example 3 of Appendix B cannot be factorising.
15 The coherence of PN guarantees that for empty I or O the corresponding condition is trivially satisﬁed.
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who also gives, for the case N = {1,2}, a proof for the external additivity of the strong product [3, Theorem 1]. We generalise
his result by proving that both the strong product and the epistemic natural extension are generally (strongly) externally
additive.
Proposition 27. Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N. Then both their strong product SN and their independent
natural extension EN are strongly externally additive, and therefore also externally additive.
It follows from the deﬁnition that any convex combination of (strongly) externally additive coherent lower previsions is
again (strongly) externally additive. In fact, looking at the proof of this result in Appendix A, we see that any many-to-one
independent product of the given marginals that is dominated by the strong product is also externally additive. To see that this does
not extend to all many-to-one independent products, consider Example 3 in Appendix B.
On the other hand, Example 4 in the same appendix shows that the properties of external additivity and strong external
additivity are not equivalent. It also shows that not all many-to-one independent products between the independent natural
extension and the strong product are strongly externally additive.
7. Factorisation and independence
Since we know from Proposition 8(iv) that the strong product is factorising, we wonder if we can use factorising lower
previsions as many-to-one independent products. That this is indeed the case is proved in the following theorem:
Theorem 28. Consider an arbitrary coherent lower prevision P N onL (XN ). If it is factorising, then it is a many-to-one independent
product of its marginals Pn, n ∈ N.
It is therefore natural to ask whether, by extension, all strongly factorising lower previsions are many-to-many indepen-
dent. While we have not been able to answer this question in its full generality, we are able to show that this is indeed the
case under fairly weak additional positivity conditions.
Recall that for a factorising (or indeed any) coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ) to be an independent product,
it must be strongly coherent with the family I (P N ) of conditional lower previsions. It turns out that at least the weak
coherence is never an issue.
Theorem 29. Consider a coherent lower prevision P N on L (XN ). If it is strongly factorising, then it is weakly coherent with the
familyI (P N ).
Next, we turn to deriving a suﬃcient condition for a strongly factorising lower prevision P N on L (XN ) to be also
many-to-many independent, so strongly coherent with the family I (P N ). For any non-empty subset I of N , we see at once
that
P N
(×
i∈I
Ai
)
=
∏
i∈I
P N(Ai) and P N
(×
i∈I
Ai
)
=
∏
i∈I
P N(Ai),
where Ai ⊆Xi for all i ∈ I . Now suppose we want to condition P N on an observation XI = xI , where I is some subset of N .
To this end, we calculate the regular extension, as discussed in Section 2.6:
R(h|xI ) := max
{
μ ∈ R: P N
(
I{xI }[h − μ]
)
 0
}
,
where h is any gamble on XO and O is any subset of N \ I . If P N is strongly factorising, we see that
P N
(
I{xI }[h − μ]
)= P N(I{xI }P N(h − μ))= P N(I{xI }(P N(h) − μ))
=
{
P N({xI })(P N(h) − μ) if P N(h)μ,
P N({xI })(P N(h) − μ) if P N(h)μ,
so we conclude that
R(h|xI ) = P N(h) as soon as P N
({xI })> 0.
This means that, heuristically speaking and under some positivity assumptions, the conditional lower previsions that are
found by conditioning a strongly factorising joint lower prevision using regular extension, reﬂect the irrelevance conditions
that are involved in the deﬁnition of many-to-many independence. Taking into account that, from Theorem 3, the conditional
lower previsions derived by regular extension are strongly coherent, we deduce the following:
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independent.
It is an open problem at this point whether this positivity condition is really necessary.
Since the independent natural extension is the pointwise smallest many-to-one independent product of given marginals,
and since we have shown in Proposition 8(iv) that the strong product is in particular Kuznetsov, we deduce that the
smallest many-to-one independent product that is still Kuznetsov lies between the independent natural extension and the
strong product. For the case N = {1,2}, this was also established by Cozman [3].
Concerning the other conditions introduced in Section 3, we point out the following:
Proposition 31. Consider arbitrary coherent lower previsions Pn onL (Xn), n ∈ N, and let Q 1 and Q 2 be coherent lower previsions
on L (XN ) with these marginals Pn. Let Q 3 be any coherent lower prevision on L (XN ) such that Q 1  Q 3  Q 2 . Then the
following statements hold:
(i) If Q 1 and Q 2 are many-to-one independent products, then so is Q 3;
(ii) If Q 1 and Q 2 are factorising, then so is Q 3;
(iii) If Q 1 and Q 2 are Kuznetsov, then so is Q 3;
(iv) If Q 2 is externally additive, then so is Q 3 .
We deduce that a convex combination of many-to-one independent products of the same given marginals is again a
many-to-one independent product of these marginals. A similar result holds for factorising or Kuznetsov lower previsions.
It is also interesting to investigate the connections between independent products and the notion of productivity.
Proposition 32. Consider a coherent lower prevision P N onL (XN ). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) P N is weakly coherent withI (P N );
(ii) P N is productive.
In addition, any many-to-many independent lower prevision is productive, and any productive coherent lower prevision is many-to-
one independent. Moreover, if P N ({xI }) > 0 for every xI ∈XI and every subset I of N, then P N is many-to-many independent if and
only if it is productive.
We conclude that productivity, which is suﬃcient for the law of large numbers in Theorem 4 to hold, is intermediate
between being a many-to-one and being a many-to-many independent product, and is equivalent to many-to-many inde-
pendence when all the conditioning events have positive lower probability. Example 6 in Appendix B shows that not all
many-to-one independent lower previsions are productive, and that many-to-one and many-to-many independence are not
equivalent even if the conditioning events all have positive lower probability.
8. An application: probabilistic inference in imprecise Markov trees
Independence is at the very heart of much research done in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. In this section we show how the
independent natural extension affects a very traditional domain of AI: probabilistic graphical models. We do so by reviewing
and discussing a model and algorithm recently introduced elsewhere by some of us [11]. The coherence results that are at
the core of that algorithm rely quite heavily on the properties of the independent natural extension proved in this paper,16
such as its being the smallest many-to-many independent product, its marginalisation and associativity properties, and its
being strongly factorising.
8.1. Background notions and notation
As is widely known, a graphical model consists of a graph enriched with speciﬁc probabilistic information. One such
model is a Bayesian network [27]. Here a directed graph represents variables through nodes, and independence statements
between them by arcs. Conditional probabilities are associated with the nodes of the graph.
Let us make this more precise by introducing some notation. We tailor the notation to the case of tree topologies, which
are the focus of our attention: every node of the graph has exactly one parent, with the exception of one node, called root,
which has no parents.
We call T the set of the nodes s of the tree, and we denote the root node by . For any node s, we denote its mother
node by m(s). The root  has no mother node, and we use the convention m() = ∅. For each node s, we denote the set
16 The paper was written jointly with the present one, but published earlier due to circumstance.
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of s (its successors in the graph). We also use the notation ↓s := D(s) ∪ {s} for the subtree with root s. Similarly, we
let ↓S := ⋃{↓s: s ∈ S} for any subset S ⊆ T . For any node s, its set of non-parent non-descendants is then given by
s := T \ ({m(s)} ∪ ↓s).
With each node s of the tree, there is associated a variable Xs . We adopt the usual notation and assumptions for the
variables in the tree. In particular, variable Xs takes values in the corresponding non-empty ﬁnite set Xs , and we assume
all variables to be logically independent.
At this point we can deﬁne the probabilistic information in a Bayesian net more precisely: a generic node s is equipped
with a mass function for Xs conditional on Xm(s) = zm(s) , for all zm(s) ∈ Xm(s) . We can rephrase this in the language of
previsions by saying that each node s has a (separately coherent) conditional linear prevision Q s(·|Xm(s)) on L (Xs): for
each possible value zm(s) of the variable Xm(s) associated with its mother node m(s), we have a linear prevision Q s(·|zm(s))
for the value of Xs , conditional on Xm(s) = zm(s) .17 We call Q s(·|Xm(s)) a local uncertainty model.
The tree together with the local uncertainty models provides a compact way to deﬁne a joint probability mass function
over XT . This follows from the Markov condition, which is also what provides the graphical model with a probabilistic seman-
tics: conditional on its mother variable Xm(s) , variable Xs is assumed to be independent of its non-parent non-descendant
variables Xs . Again, in terms of lower previsions, this means that the graphical model is an equivalent representation of a
global uncertainty model PT , that is, a linear prevision deﬁned on L (XT ).
The global uncertainty model is then used for inference, which most often amounts to computing posterior beliefs (i.e.,
probabilities or expectations) for a query variable Xs conditional on XE = xE , where E is a non-empty subset of T whose
variables are in the known state xE . This task is called updating. Updating is performed by applying Bayes’s rule to the
global uncertainty model while exploiting the structure of the graph in order to perform the computation as eﬃciently as
possible. In fact, the computation of updating on a tree-shaped Bayesian network is an easy task, which is solved exactly in
time linear in the size of the tree.
8.2. Epistemic trees
Bayesian networks have been extended to deal with imprecisely speciﬁed probabilities. The resulting models are called
credal networks [4]. The extension is achieved primarily by replacing the local uncertainty models of Bayesian networks with
imprecise ones: in the most common case, this means that each mass function required to specify a Bayesian net is replaced
by a closed convex set of mass functions. In the language of previsions, in a credal network each node s is equipped with a
(separately coherent) conditional lower prevision Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) on L (Xs): for each possible value zm(s) of the variable Xm(s)
associated with its mother node m(s), we have a coherent lower prevision Q
s
(·|zm(s)) for the value of Xs , conditional on
Xm(s) = zm(s) .
As in Bayesian networks, these local uncertainty models need to be combined into a global uncertainty model that is
later used for (imprecise-probabilistic) inference. The Markov condition still plays the leading role in this process, but has to
be modiﬁed to take into account the speciﬁc notion of independence (or irrelevance) that the graph is assumed to represent.
The traditional approach in the literature focuses on strong independence: in this case, conditional on its mother variable
Xm(s) , a variable Xs is assumed to be strongly independent of its non-parent non-descendant variables Xs . The global
uncertainty model P T obtained through this so-called strong Markov condition, is called the strong extension. The strong
extension comes with a sensitivity analysis interpretation: in fact, each of its extreme points can be regarded as arising
from a Bayesian network with the same graph as the credal net, and whose local uncertainty models dominate the local
uncertainty models of the credal network. In other words, a credal network under strong independence can be regarded as
the set of all the Bayesian networks that are compatible with the probabilities that have been imprecisely speciﬁed in the
design of the credal net.
But the sensitivity analysis interpretation of an imprecise probability model is not always applicable, as we have dis-
cussed in the Introduction with reference to modelling expert knowledge. In this case an assumption of epistemic irrelevance
may allow one to represent more faithfully an expert’s beliefs.18 This point is especially important because modelling expert
knowledge is among the main motivations for using credal networks (as well as Bayesian nets).
This lead has been followed in Ref. [11] by looking at the following type of Markov condition based on epistemic
irrelevance:
CI. Consider any node s in the tree T , any subset S of its set of children C (s), and the set S :=⋂c∈S c of their common
non-parent non-descendants. Then conditional on the variable Xs, the non-parent non-descendant variables XS are assumed
to be epistemically irrelevant to the variables X↓S associated with the children in S and their descendants.
This condition turns T into a credal tree under epistemic irrelevance, which we call imprecise Markov tree.
17 In the root, this corresponds to having an unconditional local uncertainty model Q for X: a linear prevision on L (X).
18 Obviously, there may be cases where strong independence is justiﬁed in order to model an expert’s knowledge. Moreover, strong independence could
provide a good approximation to more accurate models, even when it is not entirely appropriate.
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the common statement of the Markov condition. In fact, CI seems to impose a wider set of irrelevances, focusing as it does
on sets of children of s, and on the related subtrees, rather than on a single child. But this difference is only apparent,
because the strong Markov condition, as well as the precise-probabilistic Markov condition, can be reformulated equivalently
in a completely similar way: the apparent additional irrelevances (or independencies) are actually implied by those in the
standard Markov condition [use d-separation to see that s blocks all the relevant paths]. Whether or not this is the case
when we use epistemic irrelevance is not obvious to us at present; this is due to epistemic irrelevance being a relatively
weak notion for imprecise probability models. For this reason, CI is formulated by imposing all the additional epistemic
irrelevances explicitly.
We now shed more light on two immediate consequences of CI.
First, consider some non-terminal node s different from , and its mother variable Xm(s) . We infer from CI that this
mother variable Xm(s) is epistemically irrelevant to the variable X↓C (s) conditional on Xs:
It is worth stressing that such is not necessarily the case when we reason in the opposite way: CI does not imply that X↓C (s)
is epistemically irrelevant to Xm(s) in case we observe Xs . This kind of symmetrised irrelevance (that is, independence)
can be imposed too, but its treatment is much more involved and problematical from the algorithmic side, because it
complicates the construction of the global model tremendously. In addition, we would argue that the irrelevances imposed
by CI are more natural than their symmetrised counterparts for directed graphical models. We will come back to this point
in Section 8.4.
Next, consider some node s. Then CI tells us that for any two children c1, c2 ∈ C (s) of s, the variable X↓c1 is epistemically
irrelevant to the variable X↓c2 , conditional on Xs .
It even tells us that for any two disjoint non-empty sets S1 ⊆ C (s) and S2 ⊆ C (s) of children of s, the variable X↓S1 is
epistemically irrelevant to X↓S2 , conditional on Xs . In contradistinction with the previous example, here we see that the
symmetrised irrelevance conditions (here between children) originate spontaneously from CI: we conclude that, conditional
on a node, its children c (or rather, the variables associated with their subtrees ↓c) are epistemically many-to-many indepen-
dent.
This is the speciﬁc point where our present work on the independent natural extension meets credal trees. If we want
to obtain the most conservative global model that arises through coherence from the local models and the statements of
conditional irrelevance implied by CI, then we need to compute the independent natural extension in order to summarise
the information carried by the variables associated with the subtrees ↓c, with c ∈ C (s).
8.3. Constructing the most conservative global model
Let us illustrate how to construct the most conservative global model for the variables in the tree that extends the local
models and expresses all conditional irrelevancies encoded by the imprecise Markov tree through CI. Consider the following
fragment of the tree.
Here we denote by P↓ck (·|Xs) the lower prevision on L (X↓ck ) that is the most conservative global model for X↓ck con-
structed from CI and the local models in the subtree with root ck . This is a conditional global model as it depends on the value
of Xs . For the time being, we assume that such conditional global models related to the children of s exist and have al-
ready been computed. Since we know from the foregoing discussion that the X↓c1 , . . . , X↓cn are many-to-many independent
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⊗
c∈C (s) P↓c(·|Xs), which is a conditional lower
prevision P↓C (s)(·|Xs) on L (X↓C (s)). We can reorganise the graph accordingly by clustering all the children into a single
node.
At this point, the local model Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) must be combined with P↓C (s)(·|Xs) into a least-committal (pointwise smallest)
global conditional model about X↓s . This is achieved by taking their marginal extension19
Q
s
(
P↓C (s)(·|X{m(s),s})|Xm(s)
)= Q
s
(
P↓C (s)(·|Xs)|Xm(s)
);
see Refs. [23] and [30, Section 6.7.2] for more details. Graphically:
It is clear that this process can be iterated by starting from the leaves of the tree and letting P↓t(·|Xm(t)) := Q t(·|Xm(t)) for
all leaves t , and working our way recursively up to the root. When we eventually get to the root, this process yields a global
model P↓(·|Xm()) =: P T .
A central theorem in Ref. [11] then guarantees that, under mild positivity conditions on the local upper previsions, P T is
the most conservative (pointwise smallest) joint lower prevision that coherently extends the local models and that expresses
all the conditional irrelevance statements implied by CI. This remarkable result relies quite heavily on the independent
natural extension and its properties, as introduced and studied in this paper. The particular properties that are crucial in
establishing it are: that it is the smallest many-to-many independent product (Theorem 21), that it is strongly factorising
(Theorem 24), that it satisﬁes some marginalisation and associativity properties (Theorems 18 and 23), and that all of this
can be extended to the conditional setup (Theorem 11).
These results have important implications for imprecise-probabilistic graphical models under epistemic irrelevance. They
show that epistemic irrelevance can be used in the context of at least some graphical models in much the same way as
stochastic independence or strong independence. In fact, not only does the work in Ref. [11] show by construction that
the ‘epistemic extension’ P T generally exists, but it goes further by using it to derive an eﬃcient algorithm for updating in
imprecise Markov trees—another name for credal trees. Similarly to the traditional algorithms for Bayesian nets, it works in
a distributed fashion by passing (imprecise-)probabilistic messages along the nodes of the tree until it converges and thus
yields the (exact) updated lower previsions of interest. Moreover, it works in time linear in the size of the tree, as is the
case with the more traditional algorithms for precise probabilities.
8.4. Some remarks
The results obtained with imprecise Markov trees are particularly interesting because it had been uncertain until quite re-
cently whether or not epistemic irrelevance could be used to design eﬃcient algorithms in graphical models. This is related
to epistemic irrelevance being not as well-behaved as other independence notions with respect to the graphoid axioms; see
in particular Ref. [6], but also Ref. [26] for a more positive view. Part of the interest in these results is due to complexity
reasons. Computation in credal nets based on strong independence is substantially harder than the case of Bayesian nets: it
is an NP-hard task even on polytrees20 [9]. What complexity updating credal trees under strong independence has, is still
an open problem, but preliminary analyses made by Cassio P. de Campos, based on Ref. [8, Theorem 7], indicate that this
task should be NP-hard too. If this were to be conﬁrmed, we should have a clear example where epistemic irrelevance leads
to simpler models of computation than strong independence.
On the other hand, we should take into account that these positive results have been obtained in the case of tree
topologies. The expressivity of trees should not be overlooked because, for example, updating problems in Bayesian networks
can be solved through the well-known join tree structure (this is an undirected tree, but it can be as well represented
in a directed way with minor changes).21 And yet, it does not seem likely that something similar can be done under
19 Marginal extension is, in the special case of precise probability models, also known as the law of total probability, or the law or iterated expectations.
20 These are directed graphs that become (undirected) trees after dropping the orientations of the arcs.
21 This was observed by Pearl already at the time of the original proposal by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, see Ref. [20, p. 211].
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obliged to invert the direction of some arcs. This is easy to see by considering a V-shaped graph made of two chains
that converge into a node. The problem is that the epistemic irrelevances coded by the original V-shaped polytree will
not imply in general those related to the inverted arcs in the directed tree, simply because epistemic irrelevance is an
asymmetric notion. Therefore, imprecise Markov trees do not seem suited to be exploited as tools for solving updating
problems in more general credal networks under epistemic irrelevance. This situation could perhaps change if condition
CI were reformulated to code symmetric irrelevances (that is, epistemic independencies): in this case inverting the arcs
should cause no problems. However, as we already suggested above, the development of eﬃcient algorithms for trees under
such a modiﬁed (strengthened) Markov condition appears to be quite problematic, because the condition complicates the
computation of the joint model. All these considerations lead us to conjecture that the extension of the existing results from
trees to polytrees might require a substantial increase in computational complexity.
Still, there is another direction, relying on tree topologies, that appears to be particularly promising for addressing in-
teresting problems under epistemic irrelevance. It is based on the observation that discrete-time sequential processes are
very often represented by hidden Markov models [28], which are special trees in the language of graphical models. Hidden
Markov models have a number of applications, often related to some kind of recognition: speech, gesture, or word recog-
nition. Technically, this is achieved by computing sequences of hidden variables (states) from the observation of sequences
of other, manifest, variables (outputs). In fact, in order to turn credal trees into workable imprecise hidden Markov models,
the additional complication that needs to be faced is that of querying the tree for the joint value of the hidden variables,
rather than for a single one. Recent work [7] has shown that, fortunately, such a task can be solved again exactly and with
a complexity that is essentially the same as that required for precise-probabilistic hidden Markov models. Once again, the
key to this result is the use of the independent natural extension and its properties, as developed here.
9. Conclusions
We have worked out the foundations of epistemic independence, a generalisation of stochastic independence to imprecise
probabilities. This has led to a deﬁnition of independent products, and in particular to the especially interesting and useful
notion of independent natural extension. Like the strong product, or any other independent product, for that matter, it captures
the idea of mutual irrelevance between sources of information. But it is the most conservative independent product to do
so, which indicates that it is the only one that is based solely on this mutual irrelevance (and coherence, of course).22 We
see that, because it encompasses all these types of independent product, the notion of epistemic independence has very
wide scope.
We have carried out our study by focusing on variables assuming values in ﬁnite spaces, and have followed two dif-
ferent routes. On the one hand, we have considered generalisations to imprecise probabilities of the factorisation formula:
productivity, (strong) factorisation, being (strongly) Kuznetsov. On the other, we have deﬁned many-to-one and many-to-
many independent products of marginals, or, possibly, conditionals, based on a behavioural notion of symmetrised epistemic
irrelevance, or in other words, epistemic independence. We have shown that the two routes are tightly interwoven, as fac-
torisation implies many-to-one independence and strong factorisation implies many-to-many independence (under weak
positivity assumptions). The most important notion of this paper, the independent natural extension, has been shown to
be the smallest many-to-many (and many-to-one) independent product. It also satisﬁes useful basic properties related to
marginalisation, associativity, and external additivity.
What the independent natural extension embodies, in other words, is a way to coherently extend marginal imprecise
probability models into a joint model using symmetrised epistemic irrelevance judgements alone. As far as practical appli-
cations are concerned, this task is simpliﬁed by our next important result: under mild conditions, using the independent
natural extension is equivalent to imposing strong factorisation when looking for least-committal models. In fact, this is the
crucial result that has allowed the independent natural extension to be used successfully in graphical models in Ref. [11],
as we have discussed above.
All these results appear here, at this level of generality, for the ﬁrst time. It is natural to wonder what they might
eventually lead us to.
As far as applications are concerned, we see much scope for epistemic independence. As already indicated, the domain of
graphical models is particularly worth of consideration in this respect. Future research could, as mentioned in Section 8.4,
try to extend the work in Ref. [11] to more general graphs, such as polytrees. The recent development of an eﬃcient
algorithm for the exact computation of state sequences in imprecise hidden Markov models [7] (which are special imprecise
Markov trees) should favour the emergence of new interesting applications exploiting epistemic independence. Another
potential domain of application could be probabilistic logic, and in particular the extensions that have been proposed to
embed independence [5]. This would lead to approaches to probabilistic logic allowing both for imprecise probabilities and
epistemic independence judgements.
As regards more technical questions arising from this paper, we summarise the main problems that remain open at this
stage.
22 The ‘extra information’ entering the strong product seems to be the underlying assumption of an ideal precise model. In order to make the strong
product the smallest coherent independent product, the notion of coherence would have to be strengthened.
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ditions introduced in Section 3. In Appendix B, we give a number of counterexamples that show that none of the converse
implications hold in general, except for one of them: we still do not know whether the Kuznetsov and strong Kuznetsov
conditions are generally equivalent.
Secundo, in Section 4 we have introduced many-to-one and many-to-many independent products, and we have shown in
Appendix B that the second of these notions is more restrictive. But let us look at the connections between these epistemic
notions and the more formal conditions introduced in Section 3. We have proved that a factorising coherent lower prevision
(and as a consequence also one that is strongly factorising, Kuznetsov or strongly Kuznetsov) is many-to-one independent,
although in Appendix B we can see that the converse is not true in general. We also show in Appendix B that not every
many-to-many independent product is factorising (and therefore it need not be Kuznetsov, strongly factorising or strongly
Kuznetsov). But we do not know whether a strongly factorising coherent lower prevision is necessarily many-to-many
independent.
Tertio, we have established in Section 5 that the independent natural extension is the smallest many-to-one independent
product of given marginals, and that it also is the smallest product that is factorising, strongly factorising, or many-to-
many independent. We show in Appendix B that it is neither the smallest Kuznetsov nor the smallest strongly Kuznetsov
product. Another example of this is given in Ref. [3], where it is shown that the least-committal Kuznetsov product of given
marginals may be different from the strong product.
Quarto, and related to this, we show in Example 3 that there are many-to-many independent products that dominate the
strong product, but our next conjecture, that the strong product could be the greatest factorising product of given marginals,
still remains to be proved or disproved. If the conjecture were to hold, then the strong product would also be the greatest
strongly factorising, Kuznetsov and strongly Kuznetsov product. Related to this, it might be argued that the coherent lower
prevision in Example 3 represents a somewhat pathological situation, and that it points to the fact that considering only
many-to-many independence as our main requirement could be too weak. One possibility would be to restrict ourselves
to many-to-many independent products which satisfy one of the factorisation conditions we have introduced in this paper;
this seems to be in accordance with the results in Section 5.5, which show that the coherent lower prevision in Example 3
is not factorising, and that for those marginals the only factorising product is the intuitive one. Hence, we may focus for
instance on factorising coherent lower previsions, or on many-to-many independent products which are at the same time
strongly factorising.
Finally, we do not know whether all factorising coherent lower previsions are externally additive, nor whether all strongly
factorising coherent lower previsions are. These open problems could be related to our conjecture about the strong product
being the greatest factorising lower prevision with given marginals.
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Appendix A. Proofs of results
Proof of Proposition 5. We ﬁrst show that P N is factorising if and only if (i) holds. Since the direct implication is trivial, it
suﬃces to prove the converse. Consider o ∈ N , fo ∈L (Xo) and non-negative f i ∈L (Xi) for i ∈ I , where I is any subset
of N that does not include o. Let f j be the gamble with the constant value 1, for every j /∈ I ∪ {o}. We deduce from (i) that
P N
(
fo
∏
i∈I
f i
)
= P N
(
fo
∏
i =o
f i
)
= P N
(
P N( fo)
∏
i =o
f i
)
= P N
(
P N( fo)
∏
i∈I
f i
)
,
so P N is factorising.
Next, we prove that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. Let, for notational simplicity, f R :=∏r∈R fr for any subset R of N .
(i) ⇒ (ii). If P N ( fo)  0, then the coherence of P N tells us that P N (P N ( fo) fN\{o}) = P N ( fo)P N ( fN\{o}). Similarly, if
P N ( fo) 0, then
P N
(
P N( fo) fN\{o}
)= −P N(−P N( fo) fN\{o})= P N( fo)P N( fN\{o}).
It now suﬃces to establish the equalities P N ( fN\{o}) =∏i∈N\{o} P N ( f i) and P N ( fN\{o}) =∏i∈N\{o} P N ( f i). These follow easily
by applying induction on the number of the elements in the product.
(ii) ⇒ (i). By letting fo := 1, we infer from (ii) that P N ( fN\{o}) = ∏i∈N\{o} P N ( f i), and by letting fo := −1, that
P N ( fN\{o}) = ∏i∈N\{o} P N ( f i). Going back to general fo , we now derive from (ii) and the coherence of P N that, when
P N ( fo) 0:
P N( fo)
∏
P N( f i) = P N( fo)P N( fN\{o}) = P N
(
P N( fo) fN\{o}
)
,i∈N\{o}
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P N( fo)
∏
i∈N\{o}
P N( f i) = P N( fo)P N( fN\{o}) = −P N
(−P N( fo) fN\{o})= P N(P N( fo) fN\{o}). 
Proof of Proposition 6. First, assume that P N is strongly Kuznetsov. We show that P N is strongly factorising. Consider
disjoint subsets I and O of N , a gamble g on XO and a non-negative gamble f on XI . Since P N ( f )  P N( f )  0 and
P N (g) P N (g), we infer that
P N( f g) = P N( f ) P N(g)
= [min{P N( f )P N(g), P N( f )P N(g)},max{P N( f )P N(g), P N( f )P N(g)}]
=
⎧⎨
⎩
[P N( f )PN(g), P N( f )P N(g)] if P N(g) 0,
[P N( f )PN(g), P N( f )P N(g)] if P N(g) 0 P N(g),
[P N( f )PN(g), P N( f )P N(g)] if P N(g) 0,
and by considering the lower interval bounds, we see that P N is indeed strongly factorising.
Next, assume that P N is strongly factorising. We show that P N is productive. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N ,
a gamble g on XO and a non-negative gamble f on XI . Then it follows from the fact that P N is strongly factorising and
coherent that
P N
(
f
[
g − P N(g)
])= P N( f P N(g − P N(g)))= P N( f [P N(g) − P N(g)])= 0,
so P N is indeed productive.
The proofs of the remaining implications are either similar, or trivial. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is immediate. For the second, use the ﬁrst to see that (c) and (d) are
equivalent, and that (e) and (f) are equivalent. For the other equivalences, use the self-conjugacy and coherence of PN . 
Proof of Proposition 8. The ﬁrst statement is an immediate consequence of Eq. (8) and Proposition 7(i).
We turn to the proof of the second statement. We ﬁrst show that the set ext(M (SN )) is included in {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈
N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))}. The sets M (Pn), n ∈ N , are closed [in the topology of pointwise convergence, or equivalently, in
the Euclidean topology, because we are working in ﬁnite-dimensional linear spaces]. So the Cartesian product×n∈N M (Pn)
is closed in the product topology. Since it is clear from Eq. (6) that taking a product of linear previsions is a continuous
operation with respect to these topologies, it follows that the set of linear previsions M := {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈
M (Pn)} is closed. It follows from Walley’s weak* compactness theorem [30, Theorem 3.6.1] that since SN is the lower
envelope of M , the convex compact set M (SN) is equal to the closed convex hull of its subset M . It then follows from
the extended form of the Krein–Milman Theorem in Ref. [18, p. 74] that ext(M (SN )) ⊆M (because M is closed). Suppose
ex absurdo that some extreme point SN =×n∈N Qn of M (SN ) does not belong to {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))}.
Then there must be some r ∈ N such that Qr is not an extreme point of M (Pr), so there are different Q 1r and Q 2r in M (Pr)
and α ∈ (0,1) such that Pr = αQ 1r + (1− α)Q 2r . But then SN = αQ 1N + (1− α)Q 2N , where Q 1N := (×n =r Pn) × Q 1r ∈M and
Q 2N := (×n =r Pn) × Q 2r ∈M . Since M ⊆M (SN ), this contradicts that SN is an extreme point of M (SN ). We deduce that
indeed ext(M (SN )) ⊆ {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))}.
On to the converse inequality {×n∈N Pn: (∀n ∈ N) Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn))} ⊆ ext(M (SN )). Consider arbitrary Pn ∈
ext(M (Pn)) for all n ∈ N . Then SN :=×n∈N Pn ∈ M (SN ) by Eq. (8). It follows from Minkowski’s Theorem (or Krein–
Milman Theorem in ﬁnite dimensions) that SN is a convex combination of elements of ext(M (SN )): there are m  1,
non-negative real α1, . . . ,αm such that
∑m
k=1 αk = 1 and Q 1N , . . . , Q mN in ext(M (SN )) such that SN =
∑m
k=1 αk Q kN . If m = 1
then clearly SN ∈ ext(M (SN )), so we may assume without loss of generality that m > 1.
Consider any n ∈ N , then it follows by marginalisation that Pn =∑mk=1 αk Q kn , where Q kn is the Xn-marginal of Q kN ,
k = 1, . . . ,m. [That the Xn-marginal of SN is Pn follows from Proposition 7(i).] Since Q kN ∈M (SN ) we ﬁnd that Q kN(g)
SN (g) = Pn(g) for any g ∈L (Xn), where the equality follows from (i). This implies that Q kn ∈M (Pn), k = 1, . . . ,m. But
since we assumed that Pn ∈ ext(M (Pn)) and m > 1, we must have that Q 1n = · · · = Q mn = Pn .
Since this holds for all n ∈ N , and since we already know from the argumentation above [ext(M (SN )) ⊆ M ] that
Q kN =×n∈N Q kn for k = 1, . . . ,m, we see that Q 1N = · · · = Q mN = SN and therefore SN ∈ ext(M (SN )).
The third statement is an immediate consequence of (ii) and Proposition 7(ii).
Let us ﬁnally prove the fourth statement. Consider arbitrary disjoint proper subsets I and O of N , gambles f ∈L (XI )
and g ∈L (XO ). It follows from the third statement, Eqs. (7) and (8), Proposition 7 and conjugacy that
SN( f g) = min
{
P I ( f )P O (g): P I ∈M (S I ) and P O ∈M (SO )
}
,
SN( f g) = max
{
P I ( f )P O (g): P I ∈M (S I ) and P O ∈M (SO )
}
.
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SN( f g) =min
{
ab: a ∈ S I ( f ) and b ∈ SO (g)
}
,
SN( f g) =max
{
ab: a ∈ S I ( f ) and b ∈ SO (g)
}
,
or in other words SN ( f g) = S I ( f )  SO (g). Now use the ﬁrst statement and conjugacy to ﬁnd that S I ( f ) = SN ( f ) and
SO (g) = SN (g).
The rest of the proof now follows from Proposition 6. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof of (i) is an easy consequence of the coherence condition: if P N is coherent with the family
of conditional lower previsions N (Pn,n ∈ N), then its restriction to L (XR) is coherent with the subfamily N (Pr, r ∈ R)
containing restrictions of certain elements of N (Pn,n ∈ N).
The argumentation for (ii) is similar.
For (iii), we have to prove that Q N , Q N (·|XR) and Q N (·|XS) are coherent, where for instance
Q N( f |xR) := Q N
(
f (·, xR)
)
for all xR ∈XR and f ∈L (XN ).
Since both Q N (·|XR) and Q N (·|XS) belong to I (Q N ), this follows from the coherence of Q N with I (Q N ). 
Proof of Proposition 10. We ﬁrst show that SN is a many-to-many independent product of its marginals. It will then
automatically follow that SN is a many-to-one independent product of its marginals as well. This will establish that arbitrary
linear previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N , always have many-to-many and many-to-one independent products.
To show that SN is a many-to-many independent product of its marginals, we use Theorem 2. This means that we need
to prove that (a) the family of conditional lower previsions I (SN ) is coherent; and (b) that the joint model SN is weakly
coherent with the family I (SN ).
We begin with (a). Because we are dealing with linear previsions, coherence is equivalent to the condition in Eq. (2).
Assume ex absurdo that there are f O ,I ∈L (XO∪I ) for all disjoint subsets I and O of N , and δ > 0 such that∑
O ,I
GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI )−δIA (14)
and A :=⋃O ,I suppI ( f O ,I ) = ∅.
There are two possibilities. The ﬁrst is that Pn({xn}) > 0 for all xn ∈Xn and all n ∈ N . Since SN is linear and strongly
factorising, it follows that
SN
(
GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI )
)= ∑
xI∈XI
SN
(
I{xI }
[
f O ,I (·, xI ) − SN
(
f O ,I (·, xI )
)])= ∑
xI∈XI
SN
({xI }) · 0 = 0.
Then, if we apply SN to both sides of the inequality in Eq. (14), we get that SN (A) = 0, which contradicts the assumption
that Pn({xn}) > 0 for all xn ∈Xn and all n ∈ N .
The second possibility is that there are n ∈ N and xn ∈Xn such that Pn({xn}) = 0. Consider any ε ∈ (0,1). For all n ∈ N ,
let An := {xn ∈Xn: Pn({xn}) = 0}, and let P εn be the linear prevision on L (Xn) deﬁned by
P εn
({xn}) :=
{ ε
|An| if xn ∈ An,
(1− ε)Pn({xn}) otherwise
when An is non-empty, and P εn := Pn when An is empty. Let SεN be the product of the linear previsions P εn , n ∈ N . Then for
every I , O and xI ∈XI , it holds that, with obvious notations:∣∣GO∪I ( f O ,I |xI ) − GεO∪I ( f O ,I |xI )∣∣= I{xI }∣∣SN( f I,O (·, xI ))− SεN( f O ,I (·, xI ))∣∣ I{xI }ε|XN |max | f O ,I |,
whence∣∣GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI ) − GεO∪I ( f O ,I |XI )∣∣ ∑
xI∈suppI ( f O ,I )
∣∣GO∪I ( f O ,I |xI ) − GεO∪I ( f O ,I |xI )∣∣ IAε|XN |max | f O ,I |,
recalling that A =⋃O ,I suppI ( f O ,I ). By summing over all disjoint subsets O , I of N , we obtain that∣∣∣∣∑
O ,I
GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI ) − GεO∪I ( f O ,I |XI )
∣∣∣∣ IAε|XN |∑
O ,I
max | f O ,I | =: IAεK .
If we let 0 < ε < min{δ/2K ,1}, then we infer that
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O ,I
GεO∪I ( f O ,I |XI )−
δ
2
IA .
As before, applying SεN to both sides of this inequality leads to S
ε
N (A) = 0, a contradiction.
Next, we turn to (b). By Theorem 1, we must establish the coherence of SN with each conditional linear prevision
SO∪I (·|XI ) (taken separately) for each pair of disjoint subsets I and O of N , or equivalently, that SN (I{xI }[ f − SO∪I ( f |xI )]) =
0 for all f ∈L (XO ) and all xI ∈XI . We see that indeed:
SN
(
I{xI }
[
f − SO ( f |xI )
])= SN(I{xI }[ f − SN( f )])= SN({xI })SN( f − SN( f ))= 0,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the conditional linear prevision SO∪I (·|XI ), and the second one
because SN is linear and strongly factorising.
To complete the proof, we show that SN is the only joint coherent lower prevision that is a many-to-one independent
product of the marginals Pn , n ∈ N . Since any many-to-many independent product of the marginals Pn , n ∈ N , is in particular
also a many-to-one independent product of these marginals, it will then also follow that SN is the only joint coherent lower
prevision that is a many-to-many independent product of these marginals.
Consider any linear prevision PN that is a many-to-one independent product of the marginals Pn , n ∈ N . Fix o ∈ N
and I ⊆ N \ {o}, g ∈L (Xo) and non-negative f i ∈L (Xi), i ∈ I . Let f I :=∏i∈I f i . By assumption PN and P {o}∪I (·|XI ) are
coherent, and therefore we infer from (GBR) that PN (I{xI }[g− PN(g)]) = 0 for every xI ∈XI . Hence also PN ( f I [g− PN(g)]) =∑
xi∈XI f I (xI )PN (I{xI }[g− PN(g)]) = 0, where the ﬁrst equality is due to the linearity of PN . It follows that PN is factorising,
and applying Proposition 7, we deduce that it coincides with the product SN .
Finally, assume that the lower prevision P N is a many-to-one independent product of the marginals Pn , n ∈ N . So P N is
coherent with the family of conditional linear previsions N (Pn,n ∈ N), so it must be a lower envelope of linear previsions
PN coherent with N (Pn,n ∈ N) by the lower envelope theorem [30, Theorem 8.1.10], given that the spaces Xn , n ∈ N , are
ﬁnite. Since we have seen above that there is a unique linear prevision SN coherent with N (Pn,n ∈ N), we deduce that
P N = SN . 
Proof of Theorem 11. (i) ⇒ (ii). Fix y in Y . We show that the conditional lower previsions Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ), k = 1, . . . ,m,
are coherent. Consider arbitrary gambles fk on XOk∪Ik , k = 1, . . . ,m, and arbitrary j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, xI j ∈ XI j and f ′ ∈
L (XO j∪I j ). Let gk := I{y} fk ∈ L (XOk∪Ik × Y ) and g′ := I{y} f ′ ∈ L (XO j∪I j × Y ). Then it follows from Eq. (10) that,
with obvious notations, for all zN in XN :
GyOk∪Ik ( fk|XIk )(zN ) = fk(zOk , zIk ) − Q
y
Ok∪Ik
(
fk(·, zIk )|zIk
)
= gk(zOk , zIk , y) − P Ok∪Ik
(
gk(·, zIk , y)|zIk , y
)= GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y )(zN , y),
and similarly,
GyO j∪I j
(
f ′|xI j
)
(zN) = I{xI j }(zI j )
[
f ′(zO j , xI j ) − Q yO j∪I j
(
f ′(·, xI j )|xI j
)]
= I{xI j }(zI j )I{y}(y)
[
g′(zO j , xI j , y) − P O j∪I j
(
g′(·, xI j , y)
∣∣xI j , y)]
= GO j∪I j
(
g′|xI j , y
)
(zN , y),
and therefore[
m∑
k=1
GyOk∪Ik ( fk|XIk ) − G
y
O j∪I j
(
f ′|xI j
)]
(zN ) =
[
m∑
k=1
GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y ) − GO j∪I j
(
g′|xI j , y
)]
(zN , y).
Moreover, it follows, again with obvious notations, that
suppIk (gk) :=
{
(xIk ,u) ∈XIk ×Y : gk(·, xIk ,u) = 0
}= suppIk ( fk) × {y}
and therefore
{
(xI j , y)
}∪ m⋃
k=1
suppIk (gk) =
(
{xI j } ∪
m⋃
k=1
suppIk ( fk)
)
× {y}.
Using this equality and (i), we ﬁnd that there is some zN ∈ {xI j } ∪
⋃m
k=1 suppIk ( fk) such that [
∑m
k=1 GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y ) −
GO j∪I j (g′|xI j , y)](zN , y) 0, and therefore [
∑m
k=1 G
y
Ok∪Ik ( fk|XIk ) − G
y
O j∪I j ( f
′|xI j )](zN ) 0. This implies that the collection
Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ), k = 1, . . . ,m, is coherent. Since y is arbitrary, (ii) holds.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Consider arbitrary gk ∈L (XOk∪Ik ×Y ), k = 1, . . . ,m, as well as arbitrary j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (xI j , y) ∈XI j ×Y
and g′ ∈L (XO j∪I j ×Y ). We have to prove that there is some (zN ,u) in {(xI j , y)} ∪
⋃m
k=1 suppI (gk) such thatk
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m∑
k=1
GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y ) − GO j∪I j
(
g′|xI j , y
)]
(zN ,u) 0.
Let fk := gk(·, y) ∈L (XOk∪Ik ) and f ′ := g′(·, y) ∈L (XO j∪I j ). Then it holds for all zN ∈XN that
GyOk∪Ik ( fk|XIk )(zN ) = fk(zOk , zIk ) − Q
y
Ok∪Ik
(
fk(·, zIk )|zIk
)
= gk(zOk , zIk , y) − P Ok∪Ik
(
gk(·, zIk , y)|zIk , y
)= GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y )(zN , y),
and similarly,
GyO j∪I j
(
f ′|xI j
)
(zN) = I{xI j }(zI j )
[
f ′(zO j , xI j ) − Q yO j∪I j
(
f ′(·, xI j )|xI j
)]
= I{xI j }(zI j )I{y}(y)
[
g′(zO j , xI j , y) − P O j∪I j
(
g′(·, xI j , y)
∣∣xI j , y)]
= GO j∪I j
(
g′|xI j , y
)
(zN , y),
and therefore[
m∑
k=1
GyOk∪Ik ( fk|XIk ) − G
y
O j∪I j
(
f ′|xI j
)]
(zN) =
[
m∑
k=1
GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y ) − GO j∪I j
(
g′|xI j , y
)]
(zN , y).
Since the collection Q yOk∪Ik (·|XIk ), k = 1, . . . ,m, is coherent, we infer that there is some zN ∈ {xI j } ∪
⋃m
k=1 suppIk ( fk) such
that [∑mk=1 GOk∪Ik (gk|XIk , Y ) − GO j∪I j (g′|xI j , y)](zN , y) 0. It therefore suﬃces to prove that
(zN , y) ∈
{
(xI j , y)
}∪ m⋃
k=1
suppIk (gk).
This certainly holds if zI j = xI j . If not, then there must be some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that zN ∈ suppIk ( fk), meaning that
0 = fk(·, zIk ) = gk(·, zIk , y), so indeed (zN , y) ∈ suppIk (gk). 
Proof of Proposition 12. It follows from its deﬁnition that the strong product is a lower envelope of product linear
previsions. By Proposition 10, it is therefore a lower envelope of many-to-many independent (respectively many-to-one
independent) products. Since both of these two properties are preserved by taking lower envelopes, ×n∈N Pn is also a
many-to-many and many-to-one independent product. 
Proof of Proposition 13. We infer from Proposition 12 that the strong product×n∈N Pn is coherent with the collection
N (Pn,n ∈ N). This implies in particular that N (Pn,n ∈ N) is itself coherent. 
Proof of Corollary 14. By Proposition 13, the collection N (Pn,n ∈ N) is coherent. Theorem 2 then tells us that P N is
coherent with N (Pn,n ∈ N) if and only if it is weakly coherent with N (Pn,n ∈ N). Taking into account Theorem 1, this
holds if and only if for every o ∈ N and I ⊆ N \ {o},
P N
(
I{xI }
[
f − P {o}∪I ( f |xI )
])= 0 for all f ∈L (X{o}∪I ) and all xI ∈XI .
Now use Eq. (9) to ﬁnd that
I{xI }
[
f − P {o}∪I ( f |xI )
]= I{xI }[ f (·, xI ) − Po( f (·, xI ))]. 
Proof of Theorem 16. Denote the right-hand side in Eq. (12) by Q N ( f ). It follows easily from Eq. (11) that EN ( f ) Q N ( f ),
so we concentrate on the converse inequality. Consider any real α < EN ( f ), then there are gambles gI,o in L (X{o}∪I ) for
all o ∈ N and I ⊆ N \ {o} such that
min
zN∈XN
[
f (zN) −
∑
o∈N,I⊆N\{o}
[
gI,o(zo, zI ) − Po
(
gI,o(·, zI )
)]]
 α. (15)
For every n in N , deﬁne the gamble hn on XN by hn :=∑I⊆N\{n} gI,n . Then for all zN ∈XN , hn(zN ) =∑I⊆N\{n} gI,n(zn, zI )
and
Pn
(
hn(·, zN\{n})
)= Pn
( ∑
I⊆N\{n}
gI,n(·, zI )
)

∑
I⊆N\{n}
Pn
(
gI,n(·, zI )
)
,
where the inequality follows from the coherence of Pn . We then infer from Eq. (15) and the deﬁnition of Q N ( f ) that
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zN∈XN
[
f (zN) −
∑
n∈N
[
hn(zN ) − Pn
(
hn(·, zN\{n})
)]]
 α.
Since this inequality holds for all real α < EN ( f ), we see that indeed Q N ( f ) EN ( f ). 
Next, we turn to the proof of Theorem 18. In order to do this, it will be very helpful to work with sets of the so-called
strictly desirable gambles [30]. For every n ∈ N , consider the following subset of L (Xn):
An :=
{
f ∈L (Xn): f > 0 or Pn( f ) > 0
};
we use these sets to deﬁne the following subsets of L (XR), where R is any non-empty subset of N:
A Rr :=
{
f ∈L (XR)=0: (∀xR\{r} ∈XR\{r}) f (·, xR\{r}) ∈Ar ∪ {0}
}
, r ∈ R.
We also deﬁne, for any subset S of N:
ES := posi
(
L (XS)>0 ∪
⋃
s∈S
A Ss
)
. (16)
For S = ∅, this leads to E∅ =L (X∅)>0, which we have identiﬁed with the set of positive real numbers.
We begin by proving a crucial property of all these sets An , A
N
n and EN in Lemma 35. In order to prove this result, and
a few more involved ones further on, we need the following lemmas, one of which is a convenient version of the separating
hyperplane theorem:
Lemma 33. Consider a ﬁnite subset A of L (X). Then 0 /∈ posi(L (X)>0 ∪A ) if and only if there is some linear prevision P on
L (X) with mass function p such that P ( f ) =∑x∈X p(x) f (x) > 0 for all f ∈A and p(x) > 0 for all x ∈X .
Proof. It clearly suﬃces to prove necessity. Since 0 /∈ posi(L (X)>0 ∪A ), we infer applying a version of the separating
hyperplane theorem in ﬁnite-dimensional spaces23 that there is a linear functional Λ on L (X) such that
(∀x ∈X)Λ(I{x}) > 0 and (∀ f ∈A )Λ( f ) > 0.
Then Λ(X) =∑x∈X) Λ(I{x}) > 0, and if we let P := Λ/Λ(X) then P is clearly a linear prevision on L (X) for which
P ( f ) > 0 for all f ∈A . Moreover, for any x ∈X , p(x) = P (I{x}) = Λ(I{x})/Λ(X) > 0. 
Lemma 34. Consider a convex coneA of gambles onX such thatmax f > 0 for all f ∈A . Consider any non-zero gamble g onX .
If g /∈A then 0 /∈ posi(A ∪ {−g}).
Proof. Consider a non-zero gamble g /∈ A , and assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈ posi(A ∪ {−g}). Then it follows from the
assumptions that there are m > 0, λk > 0, fk ∈ A , k = 1, . . . ,m, and μ > 0 such that 0 = ∑mk=1 λk fk + μ(−g). Hence
g ∈ posi(A ) =A , a contradiction. 
Lemma 35. Let S be any subset of N, and let R be any non-empty subset of N. Consider any n ∈ N and r ∈ R.
(i) An is a convex cone such thatL (Xn)>0 ⊆An andL (Xn)0 ∩An = ∅:
(ii) A Rr is a convex cone such thatL (XR)>0 ⊆A Rr andL (XR)0 ∩A Rr = ∅;
(iii) ES is a convex cone such thatL (XS )>0 ⊆ ES andL (XS )0 ∩ES = ∅.
Proof. (i) Immediate: use the coherence of the lower prevision Pn .
(ii) Consider any f ∈L (XR)>0. Then for all zR\{r} ∈XR\{r} , f (·, zR\{r})  0 and therefore f (·, zR\{r}) ∈An ∪ {0}. Since
moreover f = 0, it follows that f ∈A Rr . This shows that L (XR)>0 ⊆A Rr .
To prove that A Rr is a convex cone, it clearly suﬃces to show that 0 /∈ posi(A Rr ). Assume ex absurdo that there are
m > 0, λk > 0 and fk ∈A Rr such that 0 =
∑m
k=1 λk fk . Fix any zR\{r} ∈XR\{r} . Then 0 =
∑m
k=1 λk fk(·, zN\{n}), and it follows
from (i) that this can only happen if all fk(·, zR\{r}) = 0. But since this holds for all zR\{r} ∈XR\{r} , we infer that all fk = 0,
a contradiction. Hence A Nn is indeed a convex cone.
Finally, consider f ∈L (XR)0 and assume that f ∈A Rr . It already follows from the reasoning above that f < 0, and
therefore also − f ∈A Rr . Therefore 0= f + (− f ) ∈A Rr since A Rr is a convex cone [closed under addition], a contradiction.
Hence indeed L (XR)0 ∩A Rr = ∅.
23 We use the version in Appendix E.1 of Ref. [30], for the special choice V :=A ∪ {I{x} : x ∈X} and W := {0}.
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empty. Let f ∈L (XS )0 and assume ex absurdo that f ∈ ES . Then there are λs  0, μ 0, f s ∈A Ss and g > 0 such that
f = μg +∑s∈S λs f s and max{μ,maxs∈S λs} > 0.
Fix any s ∈ S . Let A := { f s(·, zS\{s}): zS\{s} ∈ XS\{s}, f s(·, zS\{s}) = 0}, then it follows from the assumptions that A is
a ﬁnite non-empty subset of As , and therefore it follows from (i) and Lemma 33 that there is a linear prevision Ps on
L (Xs) with mass function ps such that{
(∀xs ∈Xs)ps(xs) > 0,
(∀zS\{s} ∈XS\{s})
(
f s(·, zS\{s}) = 0 ⇒ Ps
(
f s(·, zS\{s})
)
> 0
)
.
We conclude that if we deﬁne the gamble gs on XS\{s} by gs(zS\{s}) := Ps( f s(·, zS\{s})) for all zS\{s} in XS\{s} , then gs > 0.
Since we can do this for all s ∈ S , we can deﬁne a mass function pS on XS by letting pS (zS ) :=∏s∈S ps(zs) > 0 for
all zS ∈XS . The corresponding linear prevision P S is of course the product linear prevision×s∈S Ps of the marginal linear
previsions Ps . But then it follows from the reasoning and assumptions above that
P S( f ) = μP S(g) +
∑
s∈S
λs P S( f s) = μP S(g) +
∑
s∈S
λs P S(gs) > 0,
because P S (g) > 0 and all P S(gs) > 0, whereas f  0 leads us to conclude that P S( f ) 0, a contradiction. 
It turns out that there is a very close relationship between the set of gambles EN and the many-to-one independent
natural extension EN :
Lemma 36. For all f ∈L (XN ), EN ( f ) = sup{α: f − α ∈ EN}.
Proof. Let, for the sake of notational simplicity, Q N ( f ) := sup{α: f −α ∈ EN}, then we have to prove that EN ( f ) = Q N ( f ).
Consider any real α such that f −α ∈ EN . Then there are non-negative μ and λn , g > 0 and fn ∈A Nn such that f −α =
μg+∑n∈N λn fn with max{μ,maxn∈N λn} > 0. We infer from fn ∈A Nn that fn(·, zN\{n}) ∈An ∪{0} for all zN\{n} ∈XN\{n} , so
we conclude by considering gn := λn fn ∈L (XN ) that λn fn(·, zN\{n}) gn(·, zN\{n})− Pn(gn(·, zN\{n})) for all zN\{n} ∈XN\{n} ,
and therefore
λn fn(zN) gn(zN) − Pn
(
gn(·, zN\{n})
)
for all zN ∈XN and all n ∈ N.
So we ﬁnd that
f (zN) − α 
∑
n∈N
[
gn(zN ) − Pn
(
gn(·, zN\{n})
)]
for all zN ∈XN ,
and therefore α  EN ( f ). Hence Q N ( f ) EN( f ).
Conversely, let α < EN ( f ), then there are ε > 0 and gn ∈L (XN ), n ∈ N , such that
α + ε|N| f (zN) −
∑
n∈N
[
gn(zN ) − Pn
(
gn(·, zN\{n})
)]
for all zN ∈XN ,
or in other words f − α ∑n∈N hn , where we let hn(zN ) := gn(zN ) − Pn(gn(·, zN\{n})) + ε for all zN ∈ XN . This implies
that hn(·, zN\{n}) ∈An for all zN\{n} ∈XN\{n} , whence hn ∈A Nn , and therefore f − α ∈ EN . We infer that α  Q N( f ) and
therefore also that EN ( f ) Q N( f ). 
We now show that for any subset R of N , ER is the set of those gambles in EN that depend at most on the variables
XR , and not on XN\R .
Lemma 37. For every subset R of N, ER = EN ∩L (XR).
Proof. The result is trivial for R = ∅ and R = N . Let us therefore assume that both R and N \ R are proper subsets of N .
Recall from Section 2 that we are interpreting gambles on XR as special gambles on XN . Keeping this in mind, it is obvious
that A Rr ⊆A Nr for all r ∈ R , and therefore ER ⊆ EN . So we already ﬁnd that ER ⊆ EN ∩L (XR).
We prove the converse inequality. Let f ∈ EN ∩L (XR) and assume ex absurdo that f /∈ ER . It follows from Lemma 35(iii)
that f = 0. Since f ∈ EN , there are S ⊆ N , f s ∈ A Ns , s ∈ S and g ∈ L (XN ) with g  0 such that f = g +
∑
s∈S fs .
Clearly S \ R = ∅, because S \ R = ∅ would imply that, with xN\R any element of XN\R , f = f (·, xN\R) = g(·, xN\R) +∑
s∈S∩R fs(·, xN\R) ∈ ER , since we infer from Lemma 38 below that f s(·, xN\R) ∈A Rs ∪ {0} for all s ∈ S ∩ R .
It follows from Lemmas 35(iii) and 34 and f /∈ ER that 0 /∈ posi(ER ∪ {− f }). Let A := { f s(·, zN\R): s ∈ S ∩ R, zN\R ∈
XN\R , f s(·, zN\R) = 0}. Then A is clearly a ﬁnite subset of ER [to see this, use a similar argument as above, involving
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function pR such that⎧⎨
⎩
(∀xR ∈XR)pR(xR) > 0,
(∀s ∈ S ∩ R)(∀zN\R ∈XN\R)P R
(
f s(·, zN\R)
)
 0,
P R( f ) < 0.
We then infer from f = f (·, zN\R) = g(·, zN\R) +∑s∈S∩R fs(·, zN\R) +∑s∈S\R fs(·, zN\R) that for all zN\R in XN\R :
0 > P R( f ) − P R
(
g(·, zN\R)
)− ∑
s∈S∩R
P R
(
f s(·, zN\R)
)= ∑
s∈S\R
P R
(
f s(·, zN\R)
)= ∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR
pR(xR) f s(xR , zN\R).
The gambles f s(xR , ·) on XN\R [where xR ∈ XR and s ∈ S \ R] can clearly not all be zero, and the non-zero ones
belong to EN\R by Lemma 38. Since EN\R is closed under positive linear combinations by Lemma 35, the gamble
h :=∑s∈N\R∑xR∈XR pR(xR) f s(xR , ·) is an element of EN\R that is everywhere strictly negative. But on the other hand
we should have that maxh > 0 by Lemma 35(iii), a contradiction. We may therefore conclude that indeed f ∈ ER . 
Lemma 38. Consider an arbitrary non-empty subset R of N and let r ∈ R. Then f (·, xN\R) ∈ A Rr ∪ {0} for all f ∈ A Nr and all
xN\R ∈XN\R .
Proof. Fix f ∈A Nr and xN\R ∈XN\R and consider the gamble g := f (·, xN\R) on XR . Then it follows from the assumptions
that for all xR\{r} ∈XR\{r}:
g(·, xR\{r}) = f (·, xR\{r}, xN\R) = f (·, xN\{r}) ∈Ar ∪ {0},
whence indeed g ∈A Rr ∪ {0}. 
Proof of Theorem 18. Use Lemma 36 and the fact that f − α ∈ EN ⇔ f − α ∈ ER for all f ∈L (XR), by Lemma 37. 
Next, consider an arbitrary subset R of N and consider, for each xR ∈XR , the set of gambles:
EN |xR :=
{
f ∈L (XN\R): I{xR } f ∈ EN
}
.
Note that if R is the empty set then we obtain trivially that EN |x∅ = EN .
Then the set EN satisﬁes the following interesting epistemic irrelevance condition:
Lemma 39. For every subset R of N and every xN\R ∈XN\R , EN |xN\R = ER .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 37. Again, it is trivial for R = ∅ or R = N , so we turn to the case where both R
and N \ R are proper subsets of N . We ﬁrst show that EN |xN\R ⊇ ER . Consider any gamble f ∈ ER , so there are non-negative
λr and μ, fr ∈A Rr for all r ∈ R and g ∈L (XR)>0 such that f = μg +
∑
r∈R λr fr , with max{μ,maxr∈R λr} > 0. Fix r ∈ R
and let f ′r := I{xN\R } fr ∈L (XN ). Then f ′r = 0, and for all zN\{r} ∈XN\{r} , it follows from the deﬁnition of A Rr that
f ′r (·, zN\{r}) = I{xN\R }(zN\R) fr(·, zR\{r}) ∈Ar ∪ {0},
and therefore the deﬁnition of A Nr tells us that f
′
r ∈A Nr . Similarly, if we let g′ := I{xN\R }g ∈L (XN ), then g′ > 0. Hence
I{xN\R } f = μg′ +
∑
r∈R λr f ′r , and therefore I{xN\R } f ∈ EN .
We now turn to the converse inequality EN |xN\R ⊆ ER . Consider any gamble f ∈L (XR) such that I{xN\R } f belongs to
EN and assume ex absurdo that f /∈ ER . Since I{xN\R } f ∈ EN , there are S ⊆ N , f s ∈A Ns , s ∈ S and g ∈L (XN ) with g  0
such that I{xN\R } f = g+
∑
s∈S fs . Clearly S \ R = ∅, because S \ R = ∅ would imply that f = g(·, xN\R)+
∑
s∈S∩R fs(·, xN\R) ∈
ER , since Lemma 38 shows that f s(·, xN\R) ∈A Rs for all s ∈ S ∩ R .
It follows from Lemmas 35(iii), 34 and f /∈ ER that 0 /∈ posi(ER ∪ {− f }). Let A := { f s(·, xN\R): s ∈ S ∩ R, f s(·, xN\R) = 0}.
Then A is clearly a ﬁnite subset of ER [to see this, use a similar argument as above, involving Lemma 38], so we deduce
from Lemma 33 that there is some linear prevision P R on L (XR) with mass function pR such that⎧⎨
⎩
(∀xR ∈XR)pR(xR) > 0,
(∀s ∈ S ∩ R)P R
(
f s(·, xN\R)
)
 0,
P R( f ) < 0.
We then infer from f = g(·, xN\R) +∑s∈S∩R fs(·, xN\R) +∑s∈S\R fs(·, xN\R) that:
0 > P R( f ) − P R
(
g(·, xN\R)
)− ∑ P R( f s(·, xN\R))= ∑ P R( f s(·, xN\R))= ∑ ∑ pR(xR) fs(xR , xN\R).
s∈S∩R s∈S\R s∈S\R xR∈XR
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0−P R
(
g(·, zN\R)
)− ∑
s∈S∩R
P R
(
f s(·, zN\R)
)= ∑
s∈S\R
P R
(
f s(·, zN\R)
)= ∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR
pR(xR) f s(xR , zN\R).
Hence
h :=
∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR
pR(xR) f s(xR , ·) < 0.
The gambles f s(xR , ·) on XN\R [where xR ∈XR and s ∈ S \ R] can clearly not all be zero, and the non-zero ones belong to
EN\R by Lemma 38. Since EN\R is closed under positive linear combinations by Lemma 35, the gamble h < 0 is an element
of EN\R . But on the other hand we should have that maxh > 0 by Lemma 35(iii), a contradiction. We may therefore conclude
that indeed f ∈ ER . 
From this lemma, we deduce the following:
Lemma 40. Consider any subset R of N. Then f g ∈ EN for all f ∈L (XN\R)>0 and all g ∈ ER .
Proof. Consider any g ∈ ER and any f ∈ L (XN\R)>0. Then it follows from Lemma 39 that I{xN\R }g ∈ EN for all xN\R ∈
XN\R . But EN is closed under positive linear combinations by Lemma 35, and there is at least one xN\R ∈XN\R for which
f (xN\R) > 0, so we deduce that f g =∑xN\R∈XN\R f (xN\R)I{xN\R }g is essentially a positive linear combination of gambles in
EN , and therefore also belongs to EN . 
Proof of Proposition 19. We begin by showing that EN is productive. First, consider arbitrary disjoint proper subsets I and
O of N , xI ∈XI , g ∈L (XO ) and non-negative f ∈L (XI ), and let us prove that EN ( f [g − EN (g)]) 0.
Fix α > 0 and β > 0, then f + β > 0 and g − EO (g) + β ∈ EO , by Lemma 36 [where we replace the set N with O ].
Hence ( f + α)[g − EO (g) + β] ∈ EO∪I ⊆ EN , by Lemmas 40 [where we replace N with O ∪ I and R with O ] and 37. Then
Lemma 36 tells us that EN(( f +α)[g − EO (g)+ β]) 0. If we now invoke the coherence of the lower prevision EN , we see
that
0 EN
(
( f + α)[g − EO (g) + β]) EN( f [g − EO (g)])+ βEN( f ) + α[EN(g) − EO (g) + β].
Since this holds for all α > 0 and all β > 0, we infer that EN ( f [g − EN (g)]) = EN ( f [g − EO (g)])  0, where the equality
follows from Theorem 18. Hence EN is indeed productive.
Next let us consider the special cases where I or O are empty. If I = ∅, then we obtain EN ( f [g − EN (g)]) = f (EN (g) −
EN (g)) = 0, since f is then a non-negative real number. If on the other hand O = ∅, then EN ( f [g− EN (g)]) = EN ( f ·0) = 0,
since in this case g is a real number.
This implies in particular that EN (I{xI }[g− EO (g)]) 0 for arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N . Assume ex absurdo that
EN (I{xI }[g− EO (g)]) > 0. By Lemma 36, there is some α > 0 such that I{xI }[g− EO (g)]−α ∈ EN . Since I{xI }[g− EO (g)−α]
I{xI }[g− EO (g)]−α, this implies that I{xI }[g− EN (g)−α] ∈ EN . By Lemmas 39 and 37, this implies that g− EO (g)−α ∈ EO .
But then Lemma 36 implies that −α = EO (g − EO (g) − α) 0, a contradiction. Hence indeed EN (I{xI }[g − EO (g)]) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 20. By Theorem 2, it suﬃces to prove that (a) EN is weakly coherent with the family I (EN ); and that
(b) the family I (EN ) is coherent.
We begin by showing that (a) EN is weakly coherent with the family I (EN ). Consider any disjoint subsets I and O of N .
Taking into account Theorem 1, it suﬃces to show that EN (I{xI }[ f − EO∪I ( f |xI )]) = 0 for all xI ∈XI and all f ∈L (XO∪I ).
If we look at Eq. (13), we see that this amounts to proving that EN (I{xI }[g− EO (g)]) = 0 for all xI ∈XI and all g ∈L (XO ).
Now use Proposition 19.
To ﬁnish the proof, we show that (b) the family I (EN ) is coherent. Assume ex absurdo that there are f O ,I ∈L (XO∪I )
for all disjoint subsets I and O of N , disjoint subsets I∗ and O ∗ of N , g ∈L (XO ∗∪I∗ ), xI∗ ∈XI∗ and δ > 0 such that∑
O ,I
GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI ) − GO∗∪I∗(g|xI∗)−δIA,
where A := {xI∗ } ∪⋃O ,I suppI ( f O ,I ). But K IA  I{xI∗ } +∑O ,I IsuppI ( f O ,I ) for some natural number K > 0, so there is some
ε := δ/K > 0 such that −δIA −εI{xI∗ } −
∑
O ,I εIsuppI ( f O ,I ) and therefore also [see Theorem 18]:
I{xI∗ }
[
g(·, xI∗) − EO∗
(
g(·, xI∗)
)− ε]∑
O ,I
[
GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI ) + εIsuppI ( f O ,I )
]
. (17)
For arbitrary disjoint I and O , it follows from the deﬁnition of suppI ( f O ,I ) and Theorem 18 that
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∑
xI∈suppI ( f O ,I )
I{xI }
[
f O ,I (·, xI ) − EO
(
f O ,I (·, xI )
)+ ε],
so we infer from Lemmas 36 and 40 that the gamble GO∪I ( f O ,I |XI ) + εIsuppI ( f O ,I ) belongs to the convex cone EN . So
does, therefore, the right-hand side in Eq. (17). As a consequence, I{xI∗ }[g(·, xI∗) − EO ∗(g(·, xI∗)) − ε] ∈ EN , so we infer
from Lemmas 39 and 37 that g(·, xI∗) − EO ∗(g(·, xI∗)) − ε ∈ EO ∗ . But then Lemma 36 and the coherence of EO ∗ lead to
−ε = EO ∗(g(·, xI∗ ) − EO ∗(g(·, xI∗)) − ε) 0, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 22. Denote the independent natural extension
⊗
n∈N Pn by EN , and the strong product×n∈N Pn by SN .
We use the characterisation of factorisation in Proposition 5, and we take into account that for all n ∈ N and fn ∈L (Xn),
EN( fn) = SN ( fn) = Pn( fn).
We begin by proving an auxiliary result, namely that
EN
(∏
i∈I
f i
)
=
∏
i∈I
P i( f i) for all non-negative f i ∈L (Xi), i ∈ I, (H1I )
for all subsets I of N . We give a proof by induction. It is clear from the coherence of EN that the statement (H1I ) holds for
I = ∅. Next, assume that (H1I ) holds for I = M , where M is some subset of N that does not coincide with N [this is the
induction hypothesis]. Then the statement is proved if we can show that (H1I ) holds for I = M ′ := M ∪ {n}, where n is any
element of the non-empty set N \ M .
So consider any non-negative f i ∈L (Xi), i ∈ M ′ . Let, for ease of notation, fM :=∏i∈M fi , so ∏i∈M′ f i = fM fn . Because
of the induction hypothesis, EN ( fM) =∏i∈M P i( f i), so we have to show that EN ( fM fn) = EN ( fM)Pn( fn). Because the strong
product is factorising [see Propositions 8 and 5], we also have that SN ( fM) =∏i∈M P i( f i), and therefore EN ( fM) = SN ( fM).
Since EN is dominated by the (many-to-one independent) strong product SN [see Deﬁnition 6 and Proposition 12], and
because the strong product is factorising [see Propositions 8 and 5], we see that
EN( fM fn) SN( fM fn) = SN( fM)Pn( fn) = EN( fM)Pn( fn).
We now prove the converse inequality. Recall from its deﬁnition that EN is coherent with the conditional lower prevision
P {n}∪M(·|XM) on L (X{n}∪M) deﬁned by
P {n}∪M(h|xM) := Pn
(
h(·, xM)
)
for all h ∈L (X{n}∪M) and all xM ∈XM , (18)
so it follows that:
EN( fM fn) EN
(
P {n}∪M( fM fn|XM)
)= EN( fM Pn( fn))= EN( fM)Pn( fn).
Here, the inequality follows from the coherence of EN with Pn(·|XM) and Eq. (4), the ﬁrst equality from the fact that
Pn( fM fn|XM) = fM Pn( fn|XM) by Eqs. (1) and (18), and the last equality from the coherence of EN and the fact that
Pn( fn) 0. This completes the proof of the auxiliary result.
The proof that EN is factorising goes along similar lines. Fix any o in N and any I ⊆ N \ {o}, any fo ∈L (Xo), and non-
negative f i ∈ L (Xi), i ∈ I . Let, for ease of notation, f I :=∏i∈I f i . Then we already know from the argumentation above
that EN ( f I ) = SN ( f I ) =∏i∈I P i( f i). We have to show that EN ( fo f I ) = EN ( f I Po( fo)).
As before, since EN is dominated by the (many-to-one independent) strong product SN , and because the strong product
is factorising, we see that
EN( fo f I ) SN( fo f I ) = SN( f I ) 
 Po( fo) = EN( f I ) 
 Po( fo) = EN
(
f I Po( fo)
)
.
We now prove the converse inequality. Recall from its deﬁnition that EN is coherent with the conditional lower prevision
P {o}∪I (·|XI ) on L (Xo) deﬁned by
Po(h|xI ) := Po
(
h(·, xI )
)
for all h ∈L (X{o}∪I ) and all xI ∈XI , (19)
so it follows that:
EN( fo f I ) EN
(
P {o}∪I ( fo f I |XI )
)= EN( f I P {o}∪I ( fo|XI ))= EN( f I Po( fo)).
Here, similarly as before, the inequality follows from the coherence of EN with Po(·|XI ) and Eq. (4), the ﬁrst equality from
the fact that P {o}∪I ( fo f I |XI ) = f I P {o}∪I ( fo|XI ) by Eq. (1), and the second equality from Eq. (19). 
Proof of Theorem 23. We construct the set E{N1,N2} after the fashion of Eq. (16). We let
AN1 :=
{
f ∈L (XN1): f > 0 or EN1( f ) > 0
}
and
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{
f ∈L (X{N1,N2})=0: (∀zN2 ∈XN2) f (·, zN2) ∈AN1 ∪ {0}
}
and similarly for AN2 and A
{N1,N2}
N2
. Then
E{N1,N2} := posi
(
L (X{N1,N2})>0 ∪A {N1,N2}N1 ∪A
{N1,N2}
N2
)
. (20)
We infer from Lemma 36 that AN1 ⊆ EN1 and AN2 ⊆ EN2 . Now let f1 ∈ A
{N1,N2}
N1
and consider any zN2 ∈ XN2 . Then
f1(·, zN2 ) ∈ EN1 ∪ {0}, and therefore24 I{zN2 } f1(·, zN2 ) ∈ EN1∪N2 ∪ {0} by Lemma 40. Since f1 = 0 and EN1∪N2 is a convex
cone by Lemma 35(iii), it follows that f1 =∑zN2∈XN2 I{zN2 } f1(·, zN2 ) ∈ EN1∪N2 . Hence A {N1,N2}N1 ⊆ EN1∪N2 and similarly,
A {N1,N2}N2 ⊆ EN1∪N2 , so we infer from Eq. (20) that E{N1,N2} ⊆ EN1∪N2 . Hence E{N1,N2}  EN1∪N2 , by Lemma 36.
For the converse inequality, it suﬃces to prove that E{N1,N2} is an independent many-to-one product of the marginals Pn ,
n ∈ N1 ∪ N2. We use Corollary 14(ii). Consider any o ∈ N1 ∪ N2, any I ⊆ (N1 ∪ N2) \ {o}, any g ∈L (Xo), and any xI ∈XI .
We have to prove that E{N1,N2}(I{xI }[g − Po(g)]) = 0. Let I1 := I ∩ N1 and I2 := I ∩ N2. We may assume without loss of
generality that o ∈ N2. Since the independent natural extension is factorising [by Theorem 22], we ﬁnd that indeed
E{N1,N2}
(
I{xI }
[
g − Po(g)
])= E{N1,N2}(I{xI1 }I{xI2 }[g − Po(g)])
= EN1(I{xI1 }) 
 EN2
(
I{xI2 }
[
g − Po(g)
])
= EN1(I{xI1 }) 
 0 = 0,
where the third equality follows from Corollary 14(ii). 
Proof of Theorem 24. Consider arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N , an arbitrary gamble g on XO and an arbitrary
non-negative gamble f on XI . We have to show that EN ( f g) = EN ( f EN (g)). Consider any partition N1 and N2 of N such
that I ⊆ N1 and O ⊆ N2. Since the independent natural extension E{N1,N2} = EN1 ⊗ EN2 of EN1 and EN2 is factorising by
Theorem 22, we see that E{N1,N2}( f g) = E{N1,N2}( f E{N1,N2}(g)). Now use Theorem 23 to ﬁnd that this implies that indeed
EN ( f g) = EN ( f EN (g)). 
Proof of Proposition 25. Let P {1,2} be any (many-to-one) independent product of P1 and P2, and consider the conditional
linear prevision P {1,2}(·|X2) on L (X{1,2}) deﬁned by
P {1,2}( f |x2) := P1
(
f (·, x2)
)
for all f ∈L (X{1,2}) and x2 ∈X2.
Then P {1,2} is in particular coherent with P {1,2}(·|X2). Fix f in L (X{1,2}). It follows from Eq. (4) and the self-conjugacy
of P {1,2}(·|X2) that P {1,2}( f ) = P {1,2}(P {1,2}( f |X2)). Moreover, it follows from Corollary 15 that P2 is the X2-marginal of
P {1,2} , so P {1,2}( f ) = P2(P {1,2}( f |X2)) = P2(P1( f )). This holds in particular for P N = (P1 × P2) and P N = (P1 ⊗ P2). 
Proof of Proposition 26. Let P {1,2}(·|X1) be the conditional lower prevision on L (X{1,2}) deﬁned by
P {1,2}( f |x1) := P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)
for all f ∈L (X{1,2}) and x1 ∈X1.
Then the independent natural extension P A11 ⊗ P2 is coherent with P {1,2}(·|X1), so we infer from Eq. (4) that P A11 ⊗ P2 
(P A11 ⊗ P2)(P {1,2}(·|X1)) = P A11 (P {1,2}(·|X1)), where the equality follows from Corollary 15. So we ﬁnd that(
P A11 × P2
)
( f )
(
P A11 ⊗ P2
)
( f ) min
x1∈A1
P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)
for every gamble f on X1 ×X2.
To prove that the equalities hold, consider any gamble f on X{1,2} . Since A1 is ﬁnite there is some x∗1 ∈ A1 such
that P2( f (x∗1, ·)) = minx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)). Moreover, it follows from the coherence of the lower prevision P2 that there is
some linear prevision P2 ∈ ext(M (P2)) such that P2( f (x∗1, ·)) = P2( f (x∗1, ·)). Let P1 := P
{x∗1}
1 denote the (degenerate) linear
prevision on L (X1), all of whose probability mass lies in x∗1. Observe that P1 ∈ ext(M (P A11 )). Then the deﬁnition of the
strong product implies that
min
x1∈A1
P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)= P2( f (x∗1, ·))= P2( f (x∗1, ·))= (P1 × P2)( f ) (P A11 × P2)( f ).
We turn to the second statement. Let P be any factorising product of P A11 and P2. Consider any gamble f ∈L (X{1,2}),
and let us show that the equalities hold. It suﬃces to give a proof for non-negative f , since for arbitrary gambles we
24 We can identify a gamble on X{N1,N2} in a trivial way with a unique corresponding gamble on XN1∪N2 .
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prevision operator]. Let a1 and b1 be elements of A1 such that P2( f (a1, ·)) = minx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)) and P2( f (b1, ·)) =
maxx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)). Then
P
(
f − P2
(
f (a1, ·)
))
= P
( ∑
x1∈X1
I{x1}
[
f (x1, ·) − P2
(
f (a1, ·)
)])

∑
x1∈X1
P
(
I{x1}
[
f (x1, ·) − P2
(
f (a1, ·)
)])
=
∑
x1∈A1
P
(
I{x1}
[
f (x1, ·) − P2
(
f (a1, ·)
)])+ ∑
x1∈Ac1
P
(
I{x1}
[
f (x1, ·) − P2
(
f (a1, ·)
)])
=
∑
x1∈A1
P1(I{x1})
[
P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)− P2( f (a1, ·))]+ 0 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the coherence of P and the last equality holds because P is assumed to be factorising
and because P1({x1}) = P1({x1}) = 0 for every x1 /∈ A1. Hence P ( f ) minx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)). Using the conjugacy between
P and P , we get P ( f )maxx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)).
On the other hand,
P2
(
f (b1, ·)
)= P1({b1})P2( f (b1, ·))= P (I{b1} f (b1, ·)) P ( f ) maxx1∈A1 P2
(
f (x1, ·)
)
,
where the ﬁrst equality holds because P1({b1}) = 1, and the second because P is assumed to be factorising. The ﬁrst
inequality holds because f is non-negative. We conclude that for any gamble f on X{1,2} , P ( f ) = maxx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)),
and therefore also P ( f ) =minx1∈A1 P2( f (x1, ·)), by conjugacy.
We conclude with a proof for the third statement. Assume that P2 is the vacuous lower prevision P
A2
2 with respect
to A2, and let P be any coherent lower prevision on L (X{1,2}) with marginals P A11 and P
A2
2 . Because it is coherent, P
satisﬁes
P (A1 × A2) = 1− P
(
Ac1 ×X2 ∪X1 × Ac2
)
 1− P A11
(
Ac1
)− P A22 (Ac2)= 1,
and therefore it dominates the vacuous lower prevision P A1×A2{1,2} relative to A1 × A2, which also is the independent natural
extension P A11 ⊗ P A22 of P A11 and P A22 , by the second statement.
There are now two possibilities. Either A1 has more than one element. To prove that P is an independent product of P
A1
1
and P A22 , we use Corollary 14(ii). Consider any z1 ∈X1 and any gamble f on X2. If z1 /∈ A1, then we ﬁnd by inspection
that P A1×A2{1,2} (I{z1}[ f − P2( f )]) = P A1×A2{1,2} (I{z1}[ f − P2( f )]) = 0, and therefore P (I{z1}[ f − P2( f )]) = 0. If z1 ∈ A1, then
0= P A1×A2{1,2}
(
I{z1}
[
f − P2( f )
])
 P
(
I{x1}
[
f − P2( f )
])
 P
(
I{x1}[max f −min f ]
)= [max f −min f ]P A11 ({x1})= 0.
Here, the ﬁrst and the last equalities hold because A1 has more than one element.
Or A1 has only one element x1, and then Lemma 41 implies that P ( f ) = P A22 ( f (x1, ·)) for all gambles f on X1 ×X2, so
there is only one coherent lower prevision that has these marginals. But in this case the marginal P A11 is a linear prevision,
and Proposition 25 tells us that the marginals P A11 and P
A2
2 have only one independent product, and it is equal to P . 
Lemma 41. Let P {x1}1 be the vacuous lower prevision onL (X1) relative to the singleton {x1} ⊆X1 , and let P2 be any coherent lower
prevision onL (X2). Let P be any coherent lower prevision with these marginals. Then P is unique and given by P ( f ) = P2( f (x1, ·))
for all gambles f onX1 ×X2 .
Proof. First of all, consider any gamble g on X1 ×X2 and any z1 ∈ X1 \ {x1}. We show that P (I{z1}g) = P (I{z1}g) = 0.
Indeed, by coherence of P :
0= P {x1}1 (I{z1})min g(z1, ·) = P {x1}1 (I{z1})min g(z1, ·)
 P
(
I{z1}g(z1, ·)
)= P (I{z1}g)
 P (I{z1}g) = P
(
I{z1}g(z1, ·)
)
 P {x1}(I{z1})max g(z1, ·) = P {x1}(I{z1})max g(z1, ·) = 0.1 1
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P (I{x1} f ) = P (I{x1} f ) +
∑
z1∈X1\{x1}
P (I{z1} f ) P
( ∑
z1∈X1
I{z1} f
)
= P ( f ) P (I{x1} f ) +
∑
z1∈X1\{x1}
P (I{z1} f )
= P (I{x1} f ).
But this tells us that indeed
P ( f ) = P (I{x1} f ) = P
(
I{x1} f (x1, ·)
)= P ( f (x1, ·))= P2( f (x1, ·)). 
Proof of Proposition 27. We begin with the strong product. Because of its marginalisation and associativity properties
[Proposition 8], it clearly suﬃces to consider the case N = {1,2}, and to show that S{1,2} is externally additive. So consider
arbitrary f1 in L (X1) and f2 in L (X2), then indeed:
SN( f1 + f2) = inf
{
(P1 × P2)( f1 + f2): P1 ∈ ext
(
M (P1)
)
and P2 ∈ ext
(
M (P 2)
)}
= inf{P1( f1) + P2( f2): P1 ∈ ext(M (P1)) and P2 ∈ ext(M (P 2))}
= inf{P1( f1): P1 ∈ ext(M (P1))}+ inf{P2( f2): P2 ∈ ext(M (P 2))}
= P1( f1) + P2( f2).
We ﬁnish by considering the independent natural extension. Here too, because of its marginalisation and associativity
properties [Theorems 18 and 23], it clearly suﬃces to consider the case N = {1,2}, and to show that E{1,2} is externally
additive. So consider arbitrary f1 in L (X1) and f2 in L (X2). Since we know that E{1,2} is dominated by S{1,2} , we see
that E{1,2}( f1 + f2) S{1,2}( f1 + f2) = P1( f1) + P2( f2). To prove the converse inequality, it suﬃces to use the coherence of
E{1,2} to deduce that
E{1,2}( f1 + f2) E{1,2}( f1) + E{1,2}( f2) = P1( f1) + P2( f2),
where the equality follows from Corollary 15. 
Proof of Theorem 28. We use Corollary 14(ii). Consider arbitrary o ∈ N , I ⊆ N \ {o}, xI ∈XI and g ∈L (Xo). Then, since
P N is factorising and has Xo-marginal Po:
P N
(
I{xI }
[
g − Po(g)
])= P N(I{xI }P N(g − Po(g)))= P N(0) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 29. By Theorem 1, P N is weakly coherent with the family I (P N ) if and only if it is pairwise coherent
with each of its members. Let us therefore establish the coherence of P N with each conditional lower prevision P O (·|XI )
(taken separately, for each pair of disjoint subsets I and O of N). Again using Theorem 1, we see we have to show that
P N
(
I{xI }
[
f − P O ( f |xI )
])= 0 for all f ∈L (XO ) and all xI ∈XI .
We see that indeed:
P N
(
I{xI }
[
f − P O ( f |xI )
])= P N(I{xI }[ f − P N( f )])= P N(I{xI }P N( f − P N( f )))= P N(0) = 0,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the conditional lower prevision P O (·|XI ), and the second one from
the strongly factorising character of P N . 
Proof of Proposition 31. To prove (i), we use Corollary 14(ii). Observe that Q 1, Q 2 and Q 3 all have the same marginals Pn .
Consider arbitrary o ∈ N , I ⊆ N \ {o}, xI ∈XI and g ∈L (Xo). Then it follows from the inequalities Q 1  Q 3  Q 2 that
0= Q 1
(
I{xI }
[
g − Po(g)
])
 Q 3
(
I{xI }
[
g − Po(g)
])
 Q 2
(
I{xI }
[
g − Po(g)
])= 0,
where the equalities hold because Q 1 and Q 2 are many-to-one independent products. We deduce that Q 3 is a many-to-one
independent product too.
To prove (ii), consider arbitrary o ∈ N , I ⊆ N \ {o}, fo ∈L (Xo) and non-negative f i ∈L (Xi), i ∈ N \ {o}. Let, for ease of
notation f I :=∏i∈I f i . Since Q 1 and Q 2 are factorising, we deduce from Proposition 5 that Q 1( f I ) =∏i∈I P i( f i) = Q 2( f I )
and Q 1( f I ) =∏i∈I P i( f i) = Q 2( f I ), whence Q 3( f I ) =∏i∈I P i( f i) and Q 3( f I ) =∏i∈I P i( f i). Moreover,
Q 1( f I ) 
 Po( fo) = Q 1( fo f I ) Q 3( fo f I ) Q 2( fo f I ) = Q 2( f I ) 
 Po( fo).
Hence Q 3( fo f I ) = Q 3( f I ) 
 Po( fo) = Q 3( f I Po( fo)). Applying Proposition 5 again, we deduce that Q 3 is also factorising.
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∑
r∈R fr)
∑
r∈R Pr( fr) follows
from the super-additivity of the coherent lower prevision Q 3, and that the converse inequality follows from Q 3  Q 2. 
Proof of Proposition 32. (i) ⇒ (ii). Assume that P N is weakly coherent with the family I (P N ). Consider any disjoint proper
subsets I and O of N , g ∈L (XO ) and non-negative f ∈L (XI ). By Theorem 1, it follows from the assumption that P N is
coherent with P O∪I (·|XI ), and this implies the equality P N (I{xI }[g − P N (g)]) = 0 for every xI ∈XI . The coherence [super-
additivity] of P N and the non-negativity of f then imply that:
P N
(
f
[
g − P N(g)
])

∑
xI∈XI
f (xI )P N
(
I{xI }
[
g − P N(g)
])= 0.
Hence P N is productive.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume P N is productive. Consider any disjoint proper subsets I and O of N , g ∈L (XO ) and non-negative
f ∈L (XI ). The assumption implies in particular that P N (I{xI }[g− P N (g)]) 0 for all xI ∈XI and all g ∈L (XO ). If there
were some xI ∈XI such that P N (I{xI }[g − P N (g)]) > 0, then the coherence of P N would imply that
0= P N
(
g − P N(g)
)= P N
( ∑
xI∈XI
I{xI }
[
g − P N(g)
])

∑
xI∈XI
P N
(
I{xI }
[
g − P N(g)
])
> 0,
a contradiction. So we infer from Theorem 1 that P N is weakly coherent with the family I (P N ).
To complete the proof, if P N is many-to-many independent then it is in strongly, and therefore also weakly, coherent
with the family I (P N ), and therefore productive as well. On the other hand, the ﬁrst part of this proposition, together
with Corollary 14, shows that if P N is productive it is in particular many-to-one independent. Finally, the last statement is
a consequence of Ref. [22, Theorem 11], which shows that all the conditioning events have positive lower probability then
weak and strong coherence are equivalent. 
Appendix B. Counterexamples
In this appendix, we have gathered a few examples with additional information on the notions introduced in this paper.
Example 2 (Factorisation properties are not preserved by taking lower envelopes). Let N := {1,2} and X1 :=X2 := {0,1}. Con-
sider the linear marginals P1 and Q 1 for X1 deﬁned by P1({0}) := P1({1}) := 12 , Q 1({1}) := 1 and Q 1({0}) := 0. Similarly,
consider the linear marginals P2 and Q 2 for X2 deﬁned by P2({0}) := P2({1}) := 12 , Q 2({1}) := 1 and Q 2({0}) := 0.
Let P {1,2} be the product of P1 and P2, and let Q {1,2} be the product of Q 1 and Q 2. It follows from Proposition 7 that
P {1,2} and Q {1,2} are factorising and therefore strongly factorising [for N = {1,2}, these notions are equivalent].
Now let P {1,2} be the lower envelope of P {1,2} and Q {1,2} . Consider the gamble f := I{0} on X1 and the gamble g :=
I{0} − I{1} on X2. Then P1( f ) = 12 , Q 1( f ) = 0, P2(g) = 0 and Q 2(g) = −1, and therefore
P {1,2}( f g) = min
{
P {1,2}( f g), Q {1,2}( f g)
}= min{1
2
· 0,0 · −1
}
= min{0,0} = 0,
while P {1,2}(g) = min{P2(g), Q 2(g)} = min{0,−1} = −1, and
P {1,2}
(
f P {1,2}(g)
)= P {1,2}(− f ) = min{P1(− f ), Q 1(− f )}= min
{
−1
2
,0
}
= −1
2
.
Hence P {1,2} is not (strongly) factorising.
Example 3 (The strong product is not the greatest independent product; many-to-many independent  factorising; many-to-many
independent  externally additive; productive  strongly factorising). Consider the possibility spaces X1 = X2 = {0,1}, and
let P1 and P2 be the vacuous lower previsions on L (X1) and L (X2), respectively. From the second statement in Propo-
sition 26, the strong product S{1,2} := P1 × P2 is the vacuous lower prevision on L (X{1,2}), and it coincides with the
independent natural extension E{1,2} := P1 ⊗ P2.
Let Q {1,2} be the vacuous lower prevision relative to {(0,0), (1,1)}. This lower prevision strictly dominates the strong
product S{1,2}: we have for instance that
Q {1,2}
({
(0,0), (1,1)
})= 1 > 0= S{1,2}({(0,0), (1,1)}).
Yet Q {1,2} is a many-to-one independent product of the marginals P1 and P2. [Since N = {1,2} it is then also many-to-many
independent.] To prove this, use the third statement in Proposition 26. Applying Proposition 32, it is productive too.
The lower prevision Q {1,2} is not factorising. To see this, consider the non-negative gambles f := I{1} + I{0,1} on X1 and
g := I{0} + I{0,1} on X2. Then Q {1,2}( f g) = min{2 ·1,1 ·2} = 2, whereas Q {1,2}( f )Q {1,2}(g) = 1 ·1 = 1. As a consequence, it is
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that f1 + f2  I{(0,0),(1,1)} and therefore Q {1,2}( f1 + f2) = 1 > 0 = P1( f1)+ P2( f2). This shows that not every many-to-many
independent product is externally additive.
Example 4 (Externally additive  strongly externally additive; factorising  strongly factorising). Let N := {1,2,3} and consider
the binary variables X1, X2 and X3 assuming values in X1 =X2 =X3 = {0,1}. Consider the corresponding marginal lower
previsions P1, P2 and P3 given by
P j( f j) := 12 f j(0) +
2
5
f j(1) + 110 min
{
f j(0), f j(1)
}
for f j ∈L (X j) and j = 1,2,3.
Walley [30, Example 9.3.4] has shown that the independent natural extension E{1,2} of P1 and P2 is the lower envelope of
the set of linear previsions Pk with mass functions pk , k = 1, . . . ,6 given by
k pk(1,1) pk(1,0) pk(0,1) pk(0,0)
1 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
2 15
1
5
3
10
3
10
3 15
3
10
1
5
3
10
4 425
6
25
6
25
9
25
5 211
3
11
3
11
3
11
6 29
2
9
2
9
1
3
On the other hand, the strong product S{1,2} of P1 and P2 is the lower envelope of the set of linear previsions
{P1, P2, P3, P4}.
Let P7 and P8 be the linear previsions on X3 whose respective mass functions p7 and p8 are determined by p7(1) = 25
and p8(1) = 12 , so P3 is the lower envelope of P7 and P8. Let Q {1,2,3} be the lower envelope of the following set of linear
previsions on L (X{1,2,3}):
{P1 × P7, P2 × P7, P3 × P7, P4 × P7, P1 × P8, P2 × P8, P3 × P8, P4 × P8, P5 × P8}.
Then Q {1,2,3} = min{S{1,2,3}, P5 × P8}, where S{1,2,3} is the strong product of P1, P2 and P3: because of the associativity
of the strong product, established in Proposition 8, the strong product S{1,2,3} is the lower envelope of the set of linear
previsions:
{P1 × P7, P2 × P7, P3 × P7, P4 × P7, P1 × P8, P2 × P8, P3 × P8, P4 × P8}.
To see that Q {1,2,3} is not strongly externally additive, let f be the indicator of the set {(0,0), (1,1)} ×X3 and let g be
the indicator of the set X{1,2} × {1}. Then
Q {1,2,3}( f ) + Q {1,2,3}(g) = P5
({
(0,0), (1,1)
})+ P7({1})= 5
11
+ 2
5
= 47
55
,
whereas
Q {1,2,3}( f + g) =min
{
S{1,2,3}( f + g), P5 × P8( f + g)
}
=min{S{1,2,3}( f + g), P5({(0,0), (1,1)})+ P8({1})}
=min
{
1
2
+ 2
5
,
5
11
+ 1
2
}
= 9
10
>
47
55
.
Let us show that Q {1,2,3} is not productive, from which it follows, taking into account Proposition 6, that it is not strongly
factorising either. Let f be minus the indicator of the set {1} ×X{2,3} and g minus the indicator of the set X1 × {1} ×X3.
Then it follows that
Q {1,2,3}(g) = min
{
S{1,2,3}(g), P5 × P8(g)
}
= min{−S{1,2}(X1 × {1}),−P5(X1 × {1})}
= min
{
−1
2
,− 5
11
}
= −1
2
,
and as a consequence
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(
f
[
g − Q {1,2,3}(g)
])
 P5 × P8
(
f
[
g − Q {1,2,3}(g)
])
= P5
({
(1,1)
})− 1
2
P5
({1} ×X2)
= 2
11
− 1
2
5
11
= − 1
22
< 0.
We now show that, nevertheless, Q {1,2,3} is externally additive. For this, use that Q {1,2,3} is dominated by S{1,2,3} and
that both these coherent lower previsions have P1, P2 and P3 as their marginals, and apply Proposition 31(iv).
Now, the associativity of the independent natural extension [Theorem 23] and its being dominated by the strong product
imply that
E{1,2,3}  E{1,2} ⊗ P3  E{1,2} × P3 =min{Pi × P j: i = 1, . . . ,6, j = 7,8} Q {1,2,3}.
Applying Proposition 31(i), we deduce that Q {1,2,3} is a many-to-one independent product, and from Proposition 31(ii) we
infer that it is factorising.
Example 5 (Factorising  Kuznetsov; strongly factorising  strongly Kuznetsov). Consider two binary variables X1, X2 assuming
values in the set X1 =X2 = {0,1}. Let P1, P2 be the marginal lower previsions from Example 4. Consider the gambles f :=
I{0} − I{1} on X1 and g := I{0} − I{1} on X2. Then P1( f ) = P2(g) = 0 and P1( f ) = P2(g) = 15 . As a consequence, P1( f )
P2(g) = [0, 125 ], whereas, considering the linear previsions P1, . . . , P6 in that example, we see that their independent natural
extension provides the following value for the lower bound:
E{1,2}( f g) = min
{
0,0,0,
1
25
,− 1
11
,
1
9
}
= − 1
11
.
This shows that the independent natural extension E{1,2} , which is factorising by Theorem 22, is not Kuznetsov. Moreover,
in this example where N = {1,2}, factorisation is equivalent to strong factorisation, and being Kuznetsov is equivalent to
being strongly Kuznetsov.
Example 6 (Many-to-one independent  many-to-many independent; factorising  strongly factorising). Let N := {1,2,3} and
consider the binary variables X1, X2 and X3 assuming values in X1 =X2 =X3 = {0,1}, and consider the corresponding
marginal lower previsions P1, P2 and P3 given by
P j( f j) := 12 f j(0) +
2
5
f j(1) + 110 min
{
f j(0), f j(1)
}
for all f j ∈L (X j)
for j = 1,2,3. Let E{1,2,3} denote their independent natural extension and S{1,2,3} their strong product.
Deﬁne the coherent lower prevision Q {1,2,3} on L (X{1,2,3}) as the convex mixture Q {1,2,3} := 12 (E{1,2,3} + S{1,2,3}). It
follows from Proposition 31 that Q {1,2,3} is factorising, and a many-to-one independent product. We are going to prove that
Q {1,2,3} is not a many-to-many independent product. It will then follow from Theorem 29 that it is not strongly factorising
either.
Consider the conditional lower prevision Q {1,2,3}(·|X3) derived from the joint lower prevision Q {1,2,3} using the epis-
temic irrelevance of X3 to X{1,2}:
Q {1,2,3}( f |x3) := Q {1,2,3}
(
f (·, x3)
)
for all x3 ∈X3 and all f ∈L (X{1,2,3}).
In order to show that it Q {1,2,3} is not a many-to-many independent product, it suﬃces to show that it is not weakly
coherent with this conditional lower prevision Q {1,2,3}(·|X3). Consider the event A := {(0,0), (1,1)} that X1 = X2, and the
corresponding indicator g := IA on X{1,2} . It follows from Ref. [30, Example 9.3.4] that E{1,2,3}(A) = 511 and S{1,2,3}(A) = 12 ,
so
Q {1,2,3}(A) = 1
2
(
E{1,2,3}(A) + S{1,2,3}(A)
)= 1
2
(
1
2
+ 5
11
)
= 21
44
.
Let x3 = 0. Since both E{1,2,3} and S{1,2,3} are strongly factorising [by Theorem 24 and Proposition 8(iv), respectively], we
see that
E{1,2,3}
(
I{x3}
[
g − Q {1,2,3}(g)
])= P3({0})E{1,2,3}(g − Q {1,2,3}(g))= 3
5
(
5
11
− 21
44
)
= − 3
220
,
whereas
S{1,2,3}
(
I{x3}
[
g − Q {1,2,3}(g)
])= P3({0})S{1,2,3}(g − Q {1,2,3}(g))= 1
(
1 − 21
)
= 1 .2 2 44 88
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Q {1,2,3}
(
I{x3}
[
g − Q {1,2,3}(g)
])= 1
2
(
− 3
220
+ 1
88
)
= − 1
880
< 0,
so Q {1,2,3} is not coherent with Q {1,2,3}(·|X3). This also shows that Q {1,2,3} is not productive, applying Proposition 32.
Finally, note that, from Example 5 we can deduce that the independent natural extension E{1,2,3} is not Kuznetsov, and
since Q {1,2,3} has the same marginals we deduce that it is not Kuznetsov either: it suﬃces to take the same gambles f and
g from that example.
This example shows that if we consider a many-to-one independent product Q N of some given marginals Pn , n ∈ N , and
a partition of N given by sets R and S , then Q N need not be coherent with the conditional lower previsions Q R∪S (·|XS) and
Q R∪S (·|XR). In this sense the associativity properties satisﬁed by the strong product and the independent natural extension
do not extend towards their convex combinations.
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